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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1900 government revenues from all sources 
amounted to $567.2 million. Expenditures of $520.9 million 
for the fiscal year left a treasury surplus of $46.3 million. 
Gross government debt was $1,263 million, carrying annual 
interest charges of $40.2 million. The debt equalled about 
7% of national income.* There had been no central bank for 
65 years. There was no income tax -- the tax of 1894 had 
been declared unconstitutional in 1895 by the Supreme Court.** 
The financial center of the nation was firmly settled on the 
corner of Wall and Broad Sts. in New York. The role of 
government in financial matters was very small, and was 
considered rightly so. The philosophy of the day was slow-
ly recognizing that the state should have some ~urisdiction 
over business and finance, but the jurisdiction envisaged 
was that of the referee in a football game -- to see that 
the participants did not violate the rules too flagrantly. 
By 1950, government revenues had swollen to $37 
billion. Expenditures more than matched the increase, 
totaling $39.8 billion, leaving a fiscal deficit of $2.8 
billion. Government debt was outstanding in the amount of 
$254 billion, with annual interest in excess of $5.5 billion. 
In terms of national income, the debt was equal to 110%. 
* 8, p 416 
** 21, p 394 
4. 
The tax on personal incomes which had been made legal by 
a constitutional amendment in 1913, yielded the Treasury 
some $18 billion.* The central banking system established 
by the Federal Reserve Act in 1913 exercised a major degree 
of control over money and credit. Pennsylvania Avenue had 
displaced Wall Street as the financial center of the country. 
The referee had not only kept his whistle, but he was play-
ing quarterback, too, and carrying the ball much of the time. 
Fifty years is but a short time in the life of 
nations. It is a shorter time in the life of ideas. The 
past fifty years have witnessed a breathtaking metamorphosis 
in the structure of our government, and in the thinking of 
our citizens. The turbulence of the period which featured 
two major wars sandwiching one major depression, does much 
to explain the speed and scope of the expansion of govern-
ment powers. The federal structure of 1900 would have broken 
down under the demands of the forties. But how do we ex-
plain the simultaneous evolution of financial philosophy 
which has not only kept pace, but has much of the time anti-
cipated the growth of government? Even allowing for mental 
conditioning by the ~act o~ the physical evolution, could 
we not have expected at the close of World War II a reaction 
toward less government, inspired by the very speed of the 
previous expansion, if by nothing else1 
* 47, p 454 
5. 
Instead most voices are raised for more govern-
ment, not less. Those dissenting do not question the right 
of the government to its power over our financial system, 
but rather argue as to the proper ' exercise of a conceded 
power. Bitterly though the income tax vas assailed as 
national piracy less than 30 years ago, today no ~ one attacks 
it per se, but only in respect to the size of his individual 
levy. Through taxation powers and spending policies, 
through divers separate lending and guaranteeing bureaus, 
through widespread agencies as the Department of Agriculture, 
the Reconstruction Finance Corp., the Interstate Commerce 
Commission, the Federal Power Commission, the Securities 
Exchange Commission, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 
and especially through the Federal Reserve System, the 
national government possesses controlling power over every 
aspect of our financial system. Most of these institutions 
are of relatively recent origin. Each has to some degree 
lessened the area of private financial control. Each is 
generally conceded to perform a proper function in financial 
activities. 
In view of the transcending scope and rapidity of 
these economic developments, this paper is intended to trace 
the steps of the evolution of 11 big government•• in its effect 
on financial affairs. Moreover since the universal acceptance 
of the phenomenon is perhaps the most significant aspect 6f 
the era 1 the philosophical origins will be examined that 
perhaps we might draw some conclusions as to the f urther 
extent and direction of the growth. 
6. 
I. Financial History of the United States (1900-1950) 
. During the last half of the nineteenth century, 
more especially after the Civil War, the United States had 
expe~ienced one of the most rapid economic expansions in 
the history of the world. Almost overnight, it seems in 
restrospect, a vast railway system tracked over the en-
tire nation. Recent developments of machinery and of pro-
duction techniques had made large-scale operations physi-
cally possible, and the railroad provided the access to 
mass markets which made mass production economically 
possible. 
The enlarged scope of business activity required 
vast amounts of capital and credit, provided principally 
by the investment bankers of the period. The more im-
portant financial establishments were The House of Morgan, 
and Kuhn, Loeb & Co. Tremendous power was concentrated 
in the hands of a few successful pioneers. There existed 
no organized body to safeguard the public against the im-
proper exercise of this power. The period consequently 
was marred by flagrant abuses, especially in regard to 
monopolistic pricing practices, piratical competitive 
conditions, callous exploitation of labor, and widespread 
irresponsibility in financing. 
Much of the legislation of the twentieth century 
is owed directly to the abuses of the nineteenth century. 
One of the most important and controversial laws affecting 
twentieth century business operations, the Sherman Act, was 
in fact passed in 1890. 
~ · 
The extent to which the despoilers of the time 
destroyed confidence and laid the groundwork for later govern-
ment regulation may be illustrated by one relatively moderate 
example. J. P. Morgan (one of the ablest and more scrupulous 
titans) used the resources of the New Haven Railroad, which 
he controlled, to buy up all forms of transportation in an 
effort to combine the transportation system of New England. 
The purchases were all at inflated prices, and included a 
great deal of worthless property. In six years the debt ·of 
the New Haven rose from $14.5 million to $234.9 million, and 
the common stock was ruined.* In comment, Professor W. z. 
Ripley wrote: "The New Haven disaster goes far to justify 
the popular distrust of any undue concentration of power •••• 
Once and for all in New England the question seems to be 
settled that even an honest transportation monopoly is 
inimical to the best public interest. 11** If even the ''honest 
tl 1 transportation monopolies were capab e of such debauchs 
occasionally, the effect of the true Greeks, such as Jay 
Gould, can be readily imagined. 
As the development of the nation passed from the 
extensive to the intensive stage at the turn of the century, 
* 8 , pp ' l76 , 177 
** 20 , p 473 
the maladjustment and disequilibria of the earlier stage 
also became more intensive. There were two monetary panics 
in the first decade of the new century -- in 1903 and in 
1907. Altho from a mid-century perspective neither was 
very damaging of itself, it is not unlikely that they marked 
the turning point in the economic and financial life of 
the country. Both panics were followed by depressed busi-
ness conditions, and in part because the stock market had 
shown the way down, feeling against Wall Street ran high. 
The prevalent attitude is shown in the bylaws of the Knights 
of Labor, which specifically excluded from membership: 
"bankers, lawyers, stockbrokers, gamblers, and those making 
If 
or selling intoxicants. * 
g,. 
About this time, the federal government was be-
ginning to examine with lively curiosity if not yet out-
right hostility, the machinations of the bankigg and invest-
ment world. In 1904, the successful prosecution of the 
Northern Securities Company was the signal for President 
Roosevelt to prompt the Justice Department to proceed against 
other concentrations of near-monopoly power. Suits were 
brought against the big trusts in oil, sugar, tobacco, steel, 
glass, etc. 
State regulatory commissions were also springing 
up, beginning in 1905, as a result of strong public demand 
for control of railroad and public utility financing. By 
* a. pp 190-191 
10 .. 
1917 only Delaware lacked such a commission. Control over 
life insurance companies~ trust companies, and commercial 
banks was extended by both state and federal governments.* 
Woodrow Wilson crystallized the trend some time later when1 
as president, he declared: JJ The great monopoly in this 
country is the monopoly of big credits. So long as that 
exists our old variety and freedom and individual energy 
of development are out of the question. A great industrial 
nation is controlled by its system of credit. Our system 
of credit is concentrated."** 
The need for monetary and banking reform was 
accentuated by the periodic panics, especially in 1907, 
when the banks were again forced to suspend gold payments. 
The rigid structures of the existing system of reserve re-
quirements caused the banks to contract activities at the 
first sign of a business downturn. It was beginning to be 
recognized that this contributed heavily to the slump, and 
moreover, that the resultant tightness of the money supply 
hampered subsequent recovery. 
To correct these and other faults, the Aldrich-
Vreeland Act was passed in 1908, creating an emergency cur-
rency to be secured by state and municipal bonds, and by 
commercial paper. No currency was issued under this authori-
zation until the outbreak of the First World War, when 
* 8, p 19:3 
** 13, p vii 
$400 million were temporarily put into circulation. The 
Act also provided for the establishment of a National 
Monetary Commission to study currency and banking inade-
quacies, and to make recommendations for reforms. 
The Commission submitted a plan in 1911, which 
would have established a single central bank to be known 
as the National Reserve Association. The central bank was 
to control commercial banking, investment banking, and 
ll. 
stock market credit operations. Opposition to such a degree 
of centralized control was very strong, however, and, after 
the Republicans lost control, the bill was sidetracked, 
never being reported out of committee. Under President 
Wilson, the Banking and Currency Committee of the House, 
headed by Carter Glass, drafted a more acceptable measure 
which resulted in the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. The 
difficulties of rigid bank reserve structure, and inelastic 
currency were largely eliminated by the provisions of the 
Act. Distrust of concentrated central control was offset 
by the creation of twelve coordinate central banks, spread 
across the country. Only commercial banking operations 
carne within the jurisdiction of the system a.s created; in-
vestment operations were still without the aegis of central 
control.* 
After the decline in 1907, production remained at 
* 25. p l.38f:f 
moderate to low levels, never fully recoverying until the 
European War stimulated activity. The United States as the 
only important non-belligerent producer found her exports 
greatly increased and in ever-growing demand. If there is 
an economic reason for our entry in the First World war, 
it is that the prosperity enjoyed from 1914 to 1917 was 
largely dependent on Allied purchases, and largely predi-
cated upon an Allied victory.* For a brief period during 
the war an embargo was placed on gold exports, but this 
was more precautionary than necessary. The United States 
domestic economy ended the war in excellent shape. 
The national debt had increased three-fold during 
the war, and at the end of the 1918-19 fiscal year stood 
at $25.2 billion. Since only about one-third of total ex-
penditures had been raised by taxes, the burden of financing 
the war fell largely upon the newly-formed Federal Reserve 
System, providing it with a major test.** The System proved 
equal to the task. Orderly markets for government bond 
issues were maintained for the most part, and close cooper-
ation with the Treasury permitted the financing with a minimum 
of di.f.ficulty. 
With the Armistice the Federal Reserve Board was 
inclined to curb commodity prices which had doubled between 
1914 and 1918. However, Treasury insistence on a continued 
* 8. p 211-213 
** 26, pp 2-4 
low interest rate to hold down service charges on the 
national debt prevented effective anti-inflation measures.* 
After a sharp but brief slump in the immediate postwar, the 
inflationary trend resumed. Speculation was left unre-
strained, and business in general overexpanded and over-
extended itself. Commodity prices rose another 20% in five 
months. The money supply, which had more than doubled since 
the beginning of the war, continued to expand.** When these 
inflationary forces ultimately spent themselves in mid-
1920, the result was one of the most rapid and severe de-
flations in all history. The Federal Reserve System, which 
had taken no restraining measures against credit until the 
boom had already peaked, now continued to exert pressure, 
even though a more lenient policy might have seemed appro-
priate. However,from their experience at this time, the 
Board reasoned to the sound principle of exercising re-
straint in time of prosperity and relaxing restrictions in 
downturns. This maturing of philosophy contributed to 
reasonable stability during most of the remainder of the 
twenties. 
Business remained depressed until the end of 1922, 
when a recovery began which lasted almost to the end of the 
decade.*** The period was characterized by high industrial 
* ibid pp 4,.5 
** 35, p 34; 23, p 66 
*** 4 , pp 270-2.7,5 
production, relatively stable commodity prices, a minimum 
of government interference with business, and a pervading 
confidence that the vagaries of the business cycle were no 
longer operative. Because such unbounded optimism was not 
to be seen again in the next generation, the decade has 
been called nostagically the "Golden Twenties". 
Yet, never before nor since has there been such 
a distinct clearage between the fortunes of major segments 
of our economic population. While the businessman and the 
factory laborer were enjoying a rising standard of consump-
tion, the farmer was plagued by a constant severe depres-
sion, beginning with the end of the First World War and 
not to end until the beginning of the Second World War.* 
From 1914 thru 1918, the American farmer had fed (at ex-
cellent prices) not only the United States, but much of 
Europe. Shortly after the end of the war, the foreign 
market disappeared. Severe dislocations in the domestic 
economy also injured the farmer. 
Totally unfamiliar with the vital demand side of 
the economic equation, the farmer continued to till his ex-
panded acreage, and was forced to sell a prodigious output 
at prices which failed to cover costs. In a single year, _: 
from the summer of 1920 to the summer of 1921, farm prices 
fell 50%.** Since the wartime expansion had left many farmers 
* 8,. pp 215. 216 
** 23,. p 65 
with an unmanageable debt, wholesale foreclosures took 
place. Hundreds of thousands of acres were sold for taxes. 
In one Eastern state, farms were abandoned at the rate of 
272,000 acres a year from 1920 to 1931.* Considered in the 
light of two decades of virtually unrelieved poverty, it 
is more easy to understand why the farmer, traditionally 
an individualist, has eagerly embraced government price 
supports, and can even cheerfully tolerate the increased 
regulation concomitant with his favored financial position. 
On the whole, the ferment of the twenties was 
hidden under a placid surface. There was little attempt 
by government to enlarge its sphere of activity. Under 
the somnolent eye of Coolidge, and later Hoover, business 
by and large was permitted to chart its own course. But 
underneath the calm, in addition to the II II poor relation 
status of the farmer, there were many other unsatisfactory 
conditions. The major characteristic was one of extreme 
speculation, not alone in the stock market, where it was 
most spectacular, but thruout business. The building branch 
of the boom provided office space greatly in excess of the 
amount used; residential vacancies in many communities were 
abnormally high. Industrial plants continued to be built, 
although excess capacity was fairly universal. The average 
age of automobiles in use had declined at a rate 1mposstble 
16. 
to maintain.* Installment buying reached alarming propor-
tions. Export trade was largely financed by loans to foreign 
countries. The price level, though relatively stable thru-
out the period required constant bolstering. Price fixing 
was _attempted for a large variety of commodities.** 
One of the more significant trends in regard to 
the impact on financial institutions, and the furtherance 
of government entry into private areas of operation was the 
rapid growth of industrial concentration which reached full 
flower in the twenties. The evident determination of the 
government in earlier decades, to enforce the anti-trust 
provisions of the Sherman Act had. led businessmen to adopt 
new techniques to accomplish the same purpose. The "community 
of interest", most notably used by the steel industry, 
achieved near monopoly control either by gentleman's agree-
ments, or by interlocking directorates and overlapping 
management. Mergers were common; when the Clayton Act in 
1914 specifically outlawed the acquisition of the voting 
stock of competing firms, corporations began to lease or 
purchase their assets. Trade associations accomplished 
much the same purpose: a by product of the gathering and. 
dissemination of statistical information was the setting 
of market quotas and definition of operating areas.*** 
* 4, p 2S~ 
** a., PP 16-:3'"'' 
*** 8, pp 246-247 
Of all the systems devised, the holding company 
made the greatest mark. When first authorized by the legis-
lature of New Jersey in 1888, the holding company was felt 
to fall outside the j .. urisdiction of the Sherman Act. The 
decision handed down by the Supreme Court in the Northern 
Securities case showed this view to be false. Then the 
Standard 011 Co. of New Jersey was dismembered in 1911 
under the same point of law. Although the Clayton -Act of 
1914 was passed in part to clarify legal disfavor against 
the device, prosecution under the Act was difficult, and 
the holding company method was yet to experience its 
greatest growth. A study of the 97 largest industrial 
corporations of the United States on January 1, 1929 dis-
closed that 21 were pure holding companies, and 13 were 
parent companies with at least one third of their con-
trolled assets in subsidiary corporations. Although 63 
were operating companies most of them had numerous subsidi-
aries. In the utility field the holding company device 
spread with such rapidity that by 1932, ten groups of hold-
ing companies controlled 75 percent of the electric light 
and power business and 40 percent of the gas business in 
the United States.* 
In a highly competitive race for operating pro-
perties prices paid were far in excess of those justified 
* 2~,. p 239 
by the earning power of the properties. Securities were 
then issued based upon the highly inflated cost price. 
A study by the Federal Power Commission in 1935 showed 
that in 1929~ twenty-five holding companies had securities 
outstanding with a nominal market value of nearly $20 billion~ 
altho the fixed capital of the entire industry was less 
than $12 billion. By March 1st 1933, the market value of 
these securities had declined 85% from their 1929 high.* 
The metaphorical wizardry involved in milking 
the public thru the sale of these watered securities was 
greatly facilitated by conditions in the investment bank-
ing field. The total of main offices and branches of 
members of the Investment Bankers' Association mushroomed 
from 277 in 1912 to 1~902 by 1929. Highly competitive 
conditions fostered irresponsibility in the flotation of 
new issues and were directly responsible for the great 
number of bond defaults before and after the 1929 crash. 
The operations of Alfred Lowenstein~ of Ivan Krueger~ 
Samuel Insull and others were possible largely because the 
investment banking firms were willing to shower money upon 
them to support their unsound enterprises.** 
Commercial bankers, too, were infected by the 
overoptimism. The huge demand for credit~ against the 
background of an anticipated perpetual prosperity~ led to 
* 21, p 250 
** 8. pp 22.8-232 
19. 
the acquisition of loans _: and investments which were highly 
vulnerable to even a slight slump. An abnormal proportion 
of funds were placed in long-term investments, principally 
securities. The trend of the securities market might have 
inspired a more conservative attitude, but it was diffi-
cult to maintain perspective during such a period. Except 
for minor reactions, the stock market had climbed con-
tinually from 1923 to 1929. Brokers and other stock loans 
reached tremendous totals. The public was in the market 
as never before or since. Thin margins and high call loan 
rates meant that many speculators could break even only 
if their stocks continued to rise.* 
This was the situation in mid 1929. Virtually 
all segments of the economy required continuance of an 
almost impossible rate of growth in order to prevent com-
plete collapse. Momentum alone had been carrying the move-
ment along for several months. It was only a question of 
where and when the breakdown was to commence. In August 
and again in September, the stock market stumbled, but held 
on. Then, in October 1929, the stock market broke sharply, 
severely, and the whole economy of the most productive 
nation on earth virtually disintegrated.** 
The statistics of the next few years are of in-
terest for two reasons. First, they reveal one of the most 
* 4. pp 280~288 
** ibid p 29~ 
aQ. 
vicious, most painful, most enduring hangovers from over-
indulgence ever recorded. Second, they provided the basis 
for the most sweeping assault on private enterprise in the 
history of our nation. Between 1929 and 1932 common stock 
prices fell 81 percent, industrial production was cut in 
half, employment went off by one third. Payrolls were down 
50 percent; national income as a whole by even more -- about 
55 percent. There were millions of unemployed; more than 
two thousand municipalities went into bankruptcy; the banking 
system all but collapsed.* 
During the remainder of President Hoover's Admini-
stration, little action was taken. There was no precedent 
for the situation, no one seemed to know what to do. More-
over, the hope persisted that the disturbance was temporary, 
that prosperity was just around the corner. It was to be 
a long time before the corner was turned. Meanwhile the 
disintegration continued. From 1930 to 1933 nearly 10,000 
banks failed; in September and October of 1931 alone, 827 
banks closed their doors. More than 1800 banks failed in 
the six months from September 1931 to March 1932.** 
The breakdown of the banking system, and the in-
tensified hoarding by the public did inspire two positive 
legislative actions. The National Credit Corporation was 
formed for the pooling of banking resources so that loans 
* 2b, p 117 
** 9. p 54 
2]. 
might be made on call to distressed members. This step 
was ineffectual, and the corporation was replaced by the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, established in 1932 to 
extend government credit to financial institutions, business, 
and agriculture, in an effort to promote recovery. Within 
six months, loans in excess of $1 billion had been author-
ized, some 60% of which were to banks.* This enabled many 
insolvent firms temporarily to remain open. The second 
positive legislative action was the passage of the Glass 
Steagall Act on February 27, 1932. This Act permitted the 
substitution of government bonds for the acquired eligible 
paper pledged against federal reserve notes. The System 
was then able to enlarge the legal reserves of commercial 
banks, and to lower interest rates. It was hoped that the 
easing of credit both by the actions of the RFC and by the 
liberalization of reserve requirements would stimulate 
recovery. But these steps were insufficient even to slow 
the movement. When Franklin Roosevelt assumed the Presidency 
in 1933, his first official act was the declaration of a 
national emergency. In the Proclamation of March 6, 1933, 
all banking institutions were ordered to close for four days.** 
The first speech of President Roosevelt foretold 
the direction in which government was to march d~ring at 
least the next two decades: "Primarily this is because 
* 251: p ll8 
** ibid p 119 
the rulers of the exchange of mankind's good have failed 
thru their own stubbornness and their own incompetence 1 
have admitted their failures and abdicated. Practices of 
the unscrupulous money-changers stand indicated in the court 
of public opinion reflected by the hearts and minds of men. 
"True they have tried but their efforts have been 
cast in the pattern of an outworn tradition. Faced by 
failure of credit 1 they have proposed only the lending of 
more money. 
11Stripped of the lure of profit by which to induce 
our people to follmv their false leadership1 they have re-
sorted to exhortations~ pleading tearfully1 for restored 
confidence. They know only the rules of a generation of 
self-seekers. 
''They have no vision~ and when there is no vision1 
the people perish. 
"The money-changers have fled from their high 
seats in the temple of our civilization. We may now restore 
that temple to the ancient truths."* 
A strange new era was about to begin. 
While the banks were closed1 the Emergency Baru~ing 
Act was rushed thru Congress1 granting the president extra-
ordinary powers. The president was authorized during a 
time of war or national emergency to regulate banking~ gold 
* 8,. pp 220 ,.2.21 
23 . • 
movements, foreign exchange; the Secretary of the Treasury 
was empowered to call in all gold or gold certificates at 
his discretion in exchange for an equivalent amount of law-
ful u. s. currency; the Comptroller of the Currency was 
given control over operations of weakened national banks. 
The powers of the Federal Reserve Banks to issue notes were 
greatly liberalized, and loans to member banks were authorized 
on the security of any acceptable assets. 
The bank holiday had been extended indefinitely 
on March 9, and on March 13 the reopening began. By the 
end of the month more than 12,000 of the 18,000 banks oper-
ating prior to the National holiday had reopened.* 
In his Proclamation of March 6, the President had 
prohibited the export of gold, and all gold in the hands of 
the public was ordered surrendered to the government. In 
this respect the Emergency Banking Act was an ex post facto 
approval by Congress. The gold standard had in effect been 
abandoned by this move. This was all part of the preliminary 
spadework. The principal tool to be used in "restoring 
the temple" was a reflation of the sadly depressed price 
level. 
To implement this purpose the Thomas Amendment, 
or "Inflation Act" was passed on May 12. This Act authorized 
sweeping discretionary powers including the reduction of 
* 2o,, p ~21. 
24. 
the gold content of the dollar up to 50 percent, the issu-
ance of $3 billion of unsecured greenbacks, unlimited coinage 
of both gold and silver, and the additional purchase by the 
Federal Reserve Banks of $3 billion of Government obligations 
in addition to those already held. Limited changes in 
member bank reserve requirements were allowed in response 
to credit movements and needs. All coins and currency of 
the United States were declared to be full legal tender.* 
A Joint Resolution of Congress on June 5, 1933 
outlawed the "gold clause" in all contracts, present or 
future. Such contracts which provided for repayment in 
gold instead of currency at the option of the creditor, 
were in widely use, and much of the government debt featured 
the gold clause. The revocation of the clause in existing 
contracts also extended to these government bonds. This 
~as :; in effect a repudiation of contract by the federal 
government. It was in any case a vital preparation for the 
devaluation which was ahead.** 
Legislation, which in normal times would have 
inspired months of debate, was rushed through Congress 
with dizzying rapidity. Farm relief and Unemployment 
relief bills were signed on May 12, 1933. SiX days later 
the Tennessee Valley Authority was created 11 in the interest 
of national defense, and for agricultural and industrial 
* 9, pp 57-63 
** :z-~ , P:-46-,: 
development, and to improve navigation in the Tennessee 
River and Mississippi River basins."* Among the broad 
powers specified to the Authority were the construction of 
dams, reservoirs, power houses, power structures, trans-
2t'i. 
mission lines, navigation projects, and incidental works in 
the Tennessee River and its tributaries, and the union of 
the various power installations into one or more systems by 
transmission lines. The Securities Act of 1933 was passed 
on May 27, requiring full disclosure of pertinent informa-
tion affecting securities sold in interstate and foreign 
commerce, and thru the mails. The Banking Act of 1933, 
signed in June, enlarged the control of the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System over bank credit, especially 
for security transactions. Another provision ordered the 
segregation of commercial banking from investment banking 
activities; the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. was created 
to insure bank deposits. A Public Works Bill was passed 
in June, and also, on June 13th, the National Industrial 
Recovery Act became law.** 
With these laws the Federal Government felt ready 
to bring about the desired rise in prices. The Reconstruc-
tion Finance Corporation launched the program in October, 
1933 by purchasing gold at successively higher prices. In 
January 1934, the Gold Reserve Act was signed into law. 
* 21,. p 270 
** 4, pp 307,308; 25, pp 122~123 
26-. 
Under this Act the Treasurer took title to all gold coin 
and bullion in the name of the Federal Government. The 
Federal Reserve Banks, which had held most of the gold were 
issued gold certificates at the old rate of $20.67 an ounce, 
forty percent below the price of recent RFC purchases. 
Coinage of gold was forbidden, and all existing gold was 
ordered to be melted and converted into bars. A minimum 
of 40 percent was set under the devaluation power authorized 
the president by the Thomas Amendment. The power to devalue 
was limited to a period of two years. The Secretary of the 
T~easury was authorized to engage in exchange stabilization 
activities to maintain the position of the dollar. On 
January 31, 1934, the day following passage of the Act, 
President Roosevelt reduced the legal weight of the dollar 
by the 40% minimum, raising the price of gold to $35. 
This increased the dollar value of the United States' 
monetary gold stock to $6.8 billion from $4 billion, creating 
a devaluation "profit" of $2.8 billion. Two billion of 
this was set up as an Exchange Stabilization Fund, by which 
the Treasurer might smooth exchange fluctuations.* 
Much of the world was suffering similarly from 
depressed conditions. An effort was made toward internation-
al cooperation for recovery by the World Monetary and Economic 
Conference, which opened in London in mid-1933. MOnetary 
* 25 J p 123,.1.24 
fundamentalists hoped the Conference would lead to a 
general, if gradual, restoration of the gold standard. 
Although the cooperation of the United States in the in-
terest of international monetary stability had seemed 
assured, a sudden reversal in the attitude of the President 
toward any conunitments, disrupted the proceedings. The 
view taken by President Roosevelt and his advisers was 
that the precarious position of the u. S. internal economy 
required inflationary measures, not stability. Without the 
support of the U. S. the Conference was hamstrung and dis-
banded subsequently without having attained any of its 
major objectives.* 
The same reversals of policy played a prominent 
part in domestic affairs. It was a period of radical ex-
perimentation of method, but the primary ends were held 
steadfast. As any policy proved ineffective in raising the 
price level and restoring activity it was quickly abandoned, 
and in some cases a directly opposite policy replaced it. 
The NRA demonstrates the flexibility of the Administration 
in these early days. 
The primary purposes of the NRA were to raise 
wage rates, raise prices, reduce the work week, and increase 
employment.** One of the most radical attempts toward 
federally regulated commerce, the NRA fixed prices, operating 
* 4a pp 307,308 
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areas, production quotas, wages, and hours. A whole great 
bureaucracy was created to administer the mammoth scheme, 
yet the scope of the undertaking obviated the possibility 
of successful administration by so hastily formed an organi-
zation. The principles of the NRA had already been abandnned 
by the time it was declared unconstitutional in May 1935. 
Nor was the devaluation itself successful in 
raising domestic prices. Most prices advanced much less 
than the 40% by which the dollar was cut. Since the abnor-
mally low beginning price level, and other internal market 
conditions implied a natural upturn, the results of the 
devaluation were disappointing to its supporters.* The 
most important effect appears in the concerted effort of 
the rest of the world to sell its gold to the United States. 
In less than five months following the devaluation, the 
monetary gold stock of the country rose by $800 million.** 
The tremendous volume of highly important legis-
lation continued un~bated during 1934. On June 6, the 
Securities Exchange Act was passed. The Act was designed 
to correct unfair practices in the securities markets, to 
require corporations whose securities are publicly held to 
issue regularly financial and other information, and to 
regulate the use of credit in financing security transactions. 
The Securities & Exchange Commission was created to administer 
* la p 34.S 
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the provisions of this bill, and of the Securities Act of 
1933. On June 19, 1934, the Silver Purchase Act declared 
it to be the policy of the United States to increase the 
proportion of silver held to one-fourth of the value of the 
total monetary stock of gold and silver. Authority to 
purchase and sell silver in accordance with the provisions 
of the Act was given to the Secretary of the Treasury. It 
was provided that silver certificates should be issued into 
actu~l circulation in an amount not less than the cost of 
all silver purchased. This was an open subsidy to the 
silver interests since there was no financial justification 
nor need for the addition of silver to the monetapy base.* 
On August 9, the President issued a proclamation requiring 
that all silver be surrendered to the mint to be coined or 
held in bullion form by the Treasury. Also in June the Rail-
way Retirement Act saddled a bankrupt rail transportation 
system with a sizeable future liability for worker pensions. 
(This Act was declared unconstitutional in 1935, but was 
modified and passed again in that year.) 
After 1934, business activity rose irregularly, 
but fairly steadily until the latter part of 1937. This 
was aided by substantial government deficits, which in 
the eight years from 1930 to 1938 increased the national 
debt by 125 percent from $16 billion to over $36 billion.** 
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Government expenditures reached a peak in 1936 of $8.7 
billion, reflecting the determination of the Administra-
tion to reduce the impact of business cycle fluctuations 
30: .• 
by federal spending.* Compensating fiscal policy was the 
lodestone which was to guide the nation(- along the middle 
path between overactivity and depression. Deficits were 
purposely cultivated as a matter of pump-priming policy; 
the compensation was to be achieved by budgetary surpluses 
in prosperous times. Alphabetical make-work organizations 
such as the CWA, the WPA, the CCC, the PWA, the NYA, sprang 
up with sizeable appropriations. These formed a significant 
part of national activity during the depression, and helped 
relieve a good deal of suffering. The largest of these 
agencies, the Works Progress Administration, spent a total 
of more than $10 billion in its eight years, and at its peak, 
employed 3.2 million.** There was much work accomplished 
of a worthwhile and enduring nature, but in large part, 
communities thru which the funds were disbursed had no 
plans for effective use of the money, and the result in 
these cases was a sort of disguised dole. 
The use of taxation as a means of achieving de-
sired economic and social goals, as well as producing revenue 
was conceived as an important part of the government's pro-
gram. Legislation in 1933 had raised income taxes sharply 
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for the higher brackets, and for a short time a 5% with-
holding tax on corporate dividends was in effect. There 
were further increases in 1934 in income taxes and in 
estate taxes. Both were again raised in 1935, the top 
income tax rate was set at over 83%, the highest estate 
tax rate topped 72%. A graduated tax had been in use 
previously, but for the first time the graduations were 
purposely spaced to effect a partial redistribution of 
income.* 
The view that accumulated corporate surpluses 
had been partly responsible for the depression by keeping 
purchasing power out of the hands of the people, led to 
the undistributed profits tax of 1936. The top rate pro-
posed in the President's original bill amounted to 74%, 
but this was scaled down by Congress to 27%· Even though 
moderated, the tax had impressive results. Corporate 
dividends which had amounted to $2.9 billion in 1935 rose 
to $4.7 billion in 1936, and to $4.8 billion in 1937 . . 
The tax was repealed in early 1938 partly because of un-
favorable effects on the capital goods industries. Divi-
dend disbursements in 1939 fell back to $3.2 billion. 
At the same time that Congress repealed the undistributed 
profits tax, they established the first legal distinction 
between capital gains on assets held longer than 18 months 
* 19 t pp 115-1'78 
and ordinary income, reducing the tax on the former to 
15 percent.* 
Thruout this period, since the devaluation in 
1934, gold had been flowing steadily to the United States. 
The $7 billion gold stock on hand in February 1934 was 
nearly doubled during the next four years.** The reasons 
for the influx were both political and economic. Most 
outside nations had abandoned the gold standard by 1931, 
and were on actual or a semi fiat money basis. The United 
States had the only major currency still firmly tied to 
gold, and there was thus more confidence in the dollar than 
in other currencies. Also the rapid rise of Hitler in 
Germany was creating some uneasiness on the Continent and 
the wealthy began to seek a haven abroad for their money.*** 
The effect of the gold inflow on bank reserves 
was a matter of grave concern to the Federal Reserve 
authorities and the Treasury. Excess reserves grew from 
slightlyunder $1 billion at the end of January 1934 to 
nearly $3 billion by the end of the following year. The 
credit expansion potential arising from the widened base 
seemed dangerously high. The Treasury adopted the policy 
of sterilizing the incoming gold. The Board of Governors 
raised reserve requirements by 50% in 1937 and announced 
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that two more increases of 25% each were to become effec-
tive in 1937·* 
The purpose of these moves was to prevent in-
flationary overexpansion, and the result was achieved 
with startling success. In September 1937 the stock market 
broke sharply and quotations were 50% lower by the end 
of March. Industrial production fell 35% in the same 
period, one of the most rapid declines in our history.** 
The effect of the Federal Reserve action was similar to 
the case of the man who leaned against a wall, whereupon 
the building collapsed. Although the Federal Reserve was 
castigated for its action in some quarters and regarded 
with considerable awe by others, the actual impact of the 
raised reserve requirements was negligible. The building 
was about to fall down anyway. Interest rates showed 
little or no change following the Board of Governors' 
action, and commercial loans actually increased after re-
serve requirements were raised.*** 
The underlying facts are that the recovery from 
depression lows was based on several temporary stimuli, 
and that the increase in activity was too localized to be 
sustained. The Undistributed Profits Tax had an expansive 
effect on consumer goods sales but hurt the capital goods 
industries, which are mainstays of a prosperity. Increasing 
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strength of labor organizations, especially after passage 
' 
of the Wagner Act in mid-1935, achieved sharply higher wage 
rates, but employment did not expand. At the peak of 
activity in 1937, there were 8 million unemployed.* The 
stimulating effect of the $3 billion soldiers bonus paid 
in 1936,had passed. Government deficits for this and other 
purposes had in large measure .financed the recovery. The 
expansion in production had resulted largely in inventory 
accumulations rather than increased sales. These factors 
lost their strength, and the restrictive .factors reached 
full flower in the .fall of 1937, resulting in the downturn. 
With the memory or the early thirties painfully fresh, 
businessmen hastily retrenched, which probably accounts 
for the extreme aharpness of the decline. 
The government narrowly escaped a balanced budget 
for the .fiscal year ended June 30, 1938, the net deficit 
amounting to only $1.4 billion.** Receipts were bolstered 
by the first large payments from Social Security taxes, 
imposed under the provisions of the Social Security Aa.t . o~ 
1935. This Act according to original legislation and sub-
sequent amendments provides .for federal grants to the states 
to .finance local subsidies to the handicapped, and local 
unemployment insurance agencies. A compulsory old-age pen-
sion plan covering most of the labor force, and supported 
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by contributions from employers and employees, is the main 
feature of the plan. 
Large funds paid into the Old Age and Survivors 
Trust FUnd have been used against Federal deficits and to 
cover expenditures made under the Act's provisions. In 
years of balanced budgets the income of the fund may be 
employed tor credit-control purposes, for debt reduction, 
or for outside investment as determined by the Treasury 
Department.* This has never been a significant power of 
the Treasury because the budget has been balanced in only 
two years since the Act vas passed. Revenues under the 
Act thus far have been applied against deficits. The 1938 
fiscal deficit would have been half again as high without 
this income. 
The relatively small size of the deficit, and the 
drop in government expenditures which featured the 1937-38 
fiscal year were held largely responsible for the concurrent 
economic decline.** The cause and effect relationship of 
the two during the period 1s very superficial, but it is 
true that business activity and government spending, which 
had both fallen off in mid-1937, turned up together in mid-
1938. Despite increased production commodity prices moved 
horizontally until near the end of 1939. The recovery as 
before was highly unsatisfactory in many respects. Even 
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though production increased by 60~ from the 1938 bottom 
to the beginning of 1940 there still remained 10 million 
unemployed persons in the labor force.* 
There were two potentially important occurrences 
in 1938, one of which lost its significance because the other 
developed to such extent as to override all other consider-
ations. The first was the opening of hearings by the Tem-
porary National Economic Committee in December 1938. Lead-
ing industrialists, economists, and financiers were inter-
rogated by the Committee to determine what was likely to be 
the economic future of the United States. The vol~nous 
report subsequently released supports the stagnation1st 
view that business is capable of sustaining only near de-
pression levels without substantial assistance from the 
government.** The drying up of investment outlets for sav-
ings was underscored. The development of testimony and the 
reliability of conclusions derived in the hearings has been 
seriously challenged.*** In any case, the hearings were 
evidently to be the basis for further government control 
over commerce and investments. 
The other event, the appeasement of Hitler at 
Munich, was a prelude to the most devastating war so far in 
the history of the world. There was no longer any sting 
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in the T.N.E.C. findings. The main course for the nation 
was inevitably charted; even had it wished otherwise, the 
government would have been forced to increase its control 
and expand its functions. 
On the first of September 1939, Germany invaded 
Poland. England declared war on September 3, and France 
followed suit five days later. President Roosevelt declared 
a limited national emergency. The Selective Service Act 
vas quickly passed. In March 1940, the Lend Lease Act vent 
into effect permitting exports to the Allied nations without 
requiring current payment. During the life of the Act more 
than $50 billion worth of supplies were exported under its 
provisions. Reverse lease lend and repayments amounted to 
nearly $10 billion.* 
Domestic defense expenditures were also sharply 
increased. A two ocean Navy, and an 18,000 plane air force 
were provided for.** On May 27, 1940 an unlimited national 
emergency was declared. Industrial production expanded 
steadily beginning in June. On December 7, 1941, the Jap-
anese attacked American military installations at Pearl 
Harbor, and the United States was catapulted into active 
participation in the war. 
Wartime legislation in the ensuing years, although 
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extending federal control production, wages and prices, 
affected financial affairs only indirectly. This may be 
ascribed to the fact that existing laws and agencies 
required only minor amendments for almost complete juris-
diction. Legislative action would have been largely 
superficial, too, because, as a by-product of waging the 
war and financing the participation of our allies, the 
federal government acquired effective control of money 
rates and money markets. This was achieved thru manage-
ment of the federal debt which ballooned from $40.4 billion 
at the end of fiscal 1940 to $269.4 by June, 1946, an in-
crease of 570~.* 
The most important non-military decision which 
had to be made in regard to the war was the method by which 
to finance it. From June 1941 thru June 1946 total govern-
ment expenditures were more than $370 billion; in the 1944-45 
fiscal year a dizzying $100 billion was spent. Government 
spending from mid-1943 to mid-1945, averaged only a shade 
less than half of total gross national production and 
amounted to two-thirds of national income.** Forty-six 
percent of required funds were raised by taxation. Corporate 
income taxes were raised from 19% to 40%,- the excess profit 
tax was at a net rate of 85%· The assessment on incomes of 
$200,000 or over was boosted to 94 percent. Taxation 
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** i cb1d P 3 
although heavy, carried the smaller share or the burden. 
During the five war years the Treasury was forced to borrow 
$214 billion to meet deficits and build up its cash working 
balance. Of this amount, non bank investors bought $128 
billion of government securities, the Federal Reserve banks 
bought ~22 billion, and commercial banks purchased $64 
billion. Short term securities were heavily relied upon 
to keep down the interest cost of the debt, and to insure 
the whole-hearted support of banks and financial institu-
tions. Fixeq buying and selling prices were guaranteed by 
the Federal Reserve System making the short term bills 
equivalent to cash.* 
Extreme changes in banking operations were caused 
by the important role they played in war financing and by 
the growth of government agencies which financed most of 
the wartime plant construction, and the production of mili-
tary goods. The banks became principally outlets for 
government securities and sources of government funds. 
Holdings or government obligations by the banking system 
increased by 471 percent rrom 1939 to 1945. In the same 
period commercial loans increased by only 53 percent despite 
the tremendous advance in production.** Most of this loan 
increase moreover was itself for the purchase or government 
securities by others. Thus the principal runction or 
commercial banks was changed rrom financing business to 
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financing government. Business in turn was financed by 
the government, either directly or indirectly. 
Outside the banking system, the effects of this 
method of financing the war were also extremely significant. 
The tremendous volume of money created by the banks was 
made available to the public at a time when consumer goods 
were necessarily very scarce. Currency outside banks 
swelled from $8 billion at the end of June 1941 to over 
$25 billion by June 1945, the increase almost entirely 
in the form of Federal Reserve notes. Adjusted demand 
deposits rose from $29 billion to $75 billion.* The in-
flationary potential of these funds was offset partially 
by a system of rationing and price control, but black 
markets flourished during the period. 
Considering the enormous scope of the effort, 
price control operations, thru the Office of Price Admini-
stration and other minor agencies, were remarkably effective, 
In the face of sharply lower production of consumer goods 
and a continued expansion of the money supply, the task 
of effective price regulation for hundreds of thousands 
of separate items was of monumental proportions. The Federal 
Reserve helped curb demand by invoking consumer credit re-
strictions. Regulation W was announced in 1942, ordering 
larger down payments and shorter maturities on instalment 
purchases.** The success of the overall attempt, as aided 
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by the almost complete cooperation of the public may be 
measured by the realization that failure would have resulted 
in chaos. 
Instead of chaos, the end of the war in 1945 
found the United States vastly stronger than in 1940. The 
public debt had climbed to $259 billion, but there were 
many important compensating features.* The production 
capacity of the nation vas about 6~ higher than in 1939; 
the immense backlog of savings and the high current in-
comes available to the public assured a strong sustained 
demand. The problem vas to keep demand bottled up until 
reconversion difficulties were solved, and until indus-
trial output brought available supply more in line with 
pent-up demand. 
Continuation of wartime controls in peacetime, 
however, vas under severe attack by both consumers and pro-
ducers. Under mounting pressure, Congress lifted price 
controls in the summer of 1946. The cost of living which 
at the end of the war vas only 20% higher than in 1939, 
climbed another 20% in the six months after controls were 
abandoned.** 
There are many qualifications to be considered 
in weighing the effect of this Congressional declsion_ • . 
The actual rise in living costs during the war is obscured 
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because cost indices measure only reported prices which 
were often quite different from actual prices. It is 
42. 
also true that the lifting of controls did not cause the 
ensuing inflation advance, but merely brought it into the 
open. Moreover, it is possible that production would not 
have rebounded so rapidly without the stimulation of freely 
rising prices. However, despite these considerations, it 
may be considered that the lifting of pr~oe controls was 
seriously premature in view of the economic situation 
in 1946. The immediate rise in prices was severe,- only 
the remarkable ease with which reconversion was accom-
plished prevented demoralized markets.* Rising prices 
stimulate production, but runaway prices prevent it. In 
retrospect it seems that we came closer to disaster in 
this period than at any time during the war. 
After a brief postwar reconversion slump in late 
1945 and early 1946, business increased sharply, achieving 
peacetime peaks in 1947 and again in 1948. There was a 
brief slump in 1949 largely due to inventory adjustments, 
then activity rise beginning in July and extending through 
1950. During these years, shifting economic conditions 
prompted the Federal Reserve several times to take action. 
In 1948, the rediscount rate was raised, credit controls 
were tightened, and reserve requirements boosted on three 
separate occasions. Opposite action was taken during the 
* 43, pp 1-5 
1949 reaction when Regulation W was allowed to expire. 
Other government policies at times opposed Reserve action. 
Congress for example in 1948 while goods were still scarce 
increased disposable personal income by lopping about 
$4.8 billion from the nation's tax bill.* 
Perhaps the most portentous (tho not wholly un-
expected) revelation during the prosperous postwar years 
was the continuance of high government spending, and the 
recurrence of federal deficits. The surpluses called for 
in prosperity by the compensating fiscal policy plan 
proved to be wholly visionary. Government officials 
spoke strongly about the need for economy, but few tangi-
ble steps were taken. Much as the nature of banks is to 
lend, the nature of governments seems to be to spend. The 
peculiar pressures of political life seem to stultify even 
honest efforts at economy. Thus President Truman could 
sincerely say in 1946: "During the years of fighting 
financial considerations had to be subordinated to victory 
with the least sacrifice of lives. This urgency is no 
longer present. TOday government expenditures can and must 
be scrutinized minutely to obtain the maximum economy. 
The present inflationaty situation makes it imperative that 
expenditures be cut to the min~ compatible with the re-
sponsibilities of government."** Yet an analysis of federal 
budgets submitted by the President since this speech, show 
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no clean-cut trend toward austerity. Postwar experience 
points up the tendency of government during more nearly 
normal period to cling tenaciously to the advances made 
during emergencies. A survey made in October 1950 showed 
that 6 million people, 10 percent of the total labor force, 
were on govermment payrolls.* 
In 1950, except during sporadic labor disturbances, 
production indices rolled steadily upward, reaching new 
peaks in several successive months. It was industry's 
biggest year in history, topping 1948's excellent shoving 
by more than 10%. Eight million automotive vehicles, 
ninety million tons of steel, 330 billion kilowatt hours 
of electricity were produced. New records were set by 
building, petroleum, paper, lumber and other industries. 
Gross national product approached a fabulous $300 billion. 
Personal income kept pace with industry, reaching a rate 
of near $230 billion during the fourth quarter.** 
At mid-year 1950, when economists were beginning 
to feel that most of the war created backlog of consumer 
demand had been satisfied, international developments 
deferred the possibility of a downturn. The communist 
armies of North Korea in June invaded the Republic of 
Korea. Reaction by the democratic countries was swift; 
under the authority of the United ·Natton~,the United States 
placed troops in almost immediate action to oppose the 
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Red advance. Fear was general that a full scale war with 
Russia was in the making, and a frantic bidding for more 
scarce products and materials ensued. Bank credit spurted 
as business increased commitments in anticipation of re-
strictions and allocations. Consumer instalment and mort-
gage debt advanced from already record highs under the 
impact of a concentrated buying wave. Government plans 
for military expenditures were drastically revised upward, 
increasing fears of inflation. 
The Federal Reserve System acted to stem the tide 
through open market operations, and credit controls. Re-
discount rates were raised in September, and all lending 
agencies were requested to help restrict the expanding 
credit. President Truman declared a state of emergency 
in December, bringing into force his sweeping emergency 
powers. A voluntary system of price control was instituted 
while the organization required for mandatory controls 
was being set up.* If the Korean war did not blaze into 
World War III, it still seemed certain that the United 
States would support a greatly increased military organi-
zation for many years. The menace of inflation, creeping 
or swift, was stronger than ever. Restricted output of 
consumer goods in the years ahead was to be accompanied 
by continued high incomes from war production. In view 
* 31, p 20 
of the tremendous amount of inflation already fused into 
the economy, there was no alternative to close federal 
control over money and credit factors. 
III. Principal Government Financial Agencies 
A. The Federal Reserve System And The Treasury 
1. Federal Reserve System 
The Federal Reserve System was created by the 
Federal Reserve Act of December 23, 1913, as an independent 
government agency. The purpose of the System as stated in 
the preamble to the Act is to provide for the establishment 
of Federal Reserve Banks, to furnish an elastic currency, 
to af'ford means of rediscounting commercial paper, and to 
establish a more effective supervision of banking in the 
United States.* The Federal Reserve System as it exists 
today consists of the Board of Governors :; - the Federal Open 
Market Committee, the twelve Federal Reserve Banks and 
their twenty-four branches, the Federal Advisory Council, 
and approximately 6,900 member banks, including all national 
banks, and such state banks and trust companies as have 
voluntarily joined. 
4 '7 . 
The Board of Governors is composed of seven members 
appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the 
Senate. The term of office is fourteen years; one term is 
completed every two years.** The Board is the ruling body 
of' the Federal Reserve System. It possesses the power, 
within statutory limitations, to change requirements con-
cerning reserves to be maintained by member banks against 
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deposits in response to expanding or contracting credit 
movements. Discount rates charged by the Federal Reserve 
Banks to member banks are determined by the Board accord-
ing to their view of general economic needs. The Board is 
authorized to regulate the amount of credit that may be 
extended initially, and subsequently maintained on regis-
tered securities purchases. Other temporary authority to 
regulate credit enables the Board to prescribe minimum down 
payments and maximum maturities for mortgage loans, and for 
instalment credit in connection with purchases of specified 
durable goods.* 
The Open Market Committee consists of the members 
of the Board of Governors and five presidents of Federal 
Reserve Banks elected annually. This body regulates the 
conduct of open market operations with a view to the accom-
modation of commerce and business, and with regard to their 
bearing on the general credit situation of the country. No 
Reserve Bank may engage or decline to engage in open market 
operations except in accordance with the direction of and 
regulations adopted by the Committee.** 
The Federal Reserve Banks are empowered to issue 
Federal Reserve notes which constitute the bulk of money in 
circulation. Each Reserve Bank must maintain reserves in 
48. 
gold certificates covering not less than 25% of its deposits 
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and Federal Reserve notes in actual circulation. They are 
authorized to discount for member banks in their territory, 
notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and short term bankers 
acceptances arising out of commercial, industrial, and 
agricultural transactions, and short term paper secured 
49. 
by ·obligations of the United States. They may make advances 
to member banks against eligible paper, or at the descre-
tion of the individual Reserve bank upon any security 
acceptable to it. A district examining staff is maintained 
to examine regularly each member bank, and the Federal Re-
serve Banks have disciplinary and regulatory powers over 
the member banks and their officers.* 
The Federal Reserve Banks hold the legal reserves 
of the member banks, hold deposits of the Treasury, of 
foreign central banks, and of non-member banks whose checks 
they collect. They operate a highly efficient check col-
lection and clearing system. In addition to holding Treasury 
deposits, they perform other highly important fiscal ser-
vices for the Government; federal obligations are issued 
through the Reserve Banks, and they have the obligation to 
maintain an orderly market for government securities.** 
The present authority of the Federal Reserve System 
is the result of a series of amendments in response to 
changing conditions and demonstrated weaknesses. Although 
* 9, pp 328-335 
** 3, pp 548-551 
50. 
in its first annual report in 1914, the Board of Governors 
recognized that "its duty plainly is not to await emergencies, 
but, by anticipation to do what it can to prevent them," 
the ability to anticipate emergencies required both a further 
maturing of financial understanding, and enactment of 
further legislative authority.* 
The rapid expansion of credit allowed by the re-
moval of controls following World War I brought to the System 
its first of many dilemmas. The statutory requirement that 
credit be made available to business at reasonab~ rates 
prevented raising interest rates high enough to deter the 
over-expansion. The Federal Reserve Act was amended in 
1920 to permit graduated discretionary rates of discount. 
During the :·_late twenties, the rise in the use of credit 
for speculation demonstrated the inability of the System 
to control the end use of credit. The Banking Acts of 
1933 and 1935 permitted the Board of Governors to fix 
margin requirements on security loans, to refuse accomo-
dations to any bank making too many loans for speculative 
purposes, and forbade member banks to act as agents of 
corporations and individuals making security loans. During 
the early thirties the shortage of eligible commercial paper 
made it ~mpossible for the System to expand credit enough 
to aid recovery. The Banking Act of 1935 liberalized the 
requirements for loans to member banks, and by including 
* 30. p 9 
United States obligations under the definition greatly ex-
panded the available supply of eligible paper.* 
In 1937, in a highly significant statement of 
policy the Federal Open Market Committee declared that, to 
stabilize conditions in the money market, and to aid member 
banks to adjust to changes in reserve requirements, the 
Federal Reserve System would make open market purchases 
of government obligations in such amounts, and at such 
times as might be desirable.** This policy contributed 
to stability at least in the bond markets during the bal-
ance of the decade, and was vital in the forties when war 
financing ballooned the government debt. It has not yet 
been determined finally whether or not support activities 
for government securities are to be the primary consider-
ation regardless of internal economic conditions. 
2. The Treasury Department 
Almost since the Federal Reserve System was 
created, a tug-of-war has gone on between the System and 
the Treasury Department, with the balance of power shifting 
between the two. The influence of the Executive branch of 
the government has usually been exerted toward increasing 
the power of the Treasury at the expense of the Federal 
Reserve. The Treasurer of the United States as a member 
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of the Cabinet is appointed by the President, and subject to 
his will. The structure of the Federal Reserve System on 
the other hand makes it very difficult for the President to 
control it. The purposes of the Executive could therefore 
be better implemented if important power rested with the 
Treasurer.* 
The tendency was especially marked in the Roosevelt 
Administration. The Inflation Act gave the Treasurer power 
to expand the mon~y supply at his discretion by issuing 
$3 billion of unsecured greenbacks. The gold held by the 
Federal Reserve was ordered surrendered to the Treasury. 
All gold in the hands of the public was turned in to the 
Treasury. The Treasurer was given control over the Ex-
change Stabilization Fund. Authority in respect to the 
acquisition, holding, transportation, melting, exporting, 
importing, and earmarking of gold was delegated to him. 
Under the Emergency Banking Act the Treasurer, through the 
President, was authorized to control foreign exchange trans-
actions, banking operations, and gold and silver movements. 
The Gold Reserve Act authorized the Treasurer, 
with the approval of the President to flpurchase gold in 
any amounts at home or abroad, with any direct obligation, 
coin or currency of the United States authorized by law, 
or with any funds in the Treasury not otherwise appropri-
ated, at such rates and upon such terms as he may deem most 
* 1 pp 171-175 
advantageous to the public interest, any provision of law 
relating to the maintenance of parity or limiting the 
purposes for which any of such obligations, coin, or cur-
rency may be issued, or requiring any such obligations to 
be offered as a popular loan, or on a competitive basis, 
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or to be offered or issued at not less than par, to the 
contrary notwithstanding." (U. S. Code Title 31 Sec. 734)* 
This rather extravagant grant of authority gave 
the Treasurer almost dictatorial financial power. Any 
action of the Federal Reserve could be nullified easily 
by Treasury purchase or sale of gold at arbitrary prices. 
Add to this authority, the power afforded by the Emergency 
Banking Act of 1933. Section 4 of the Act provides that 
"no member bank of the Federal Reserve System shall trans-
act any banking business except to such extent and subject 
to such limitations and restrictions as may be prescribed 
by the Se~retary of the Treasury with the approval of the 
President." This power extends only over Federal Reserve 
Banks. In order to include the whole banking system it 
is necessary to go back to the Trading with the Enemy Act 
of World War I which provides that "during time of war or 
during any other period of national emergency declared by 
the President, the President may, through any agency that 
he may designate, or otherwise, and under such rules and 
regulations as he may prescribe, ••• investigate, regulate, 
* .,. PP rrz-rze 
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or prohibit any transaction in foreign exchange, transfers 
of credit, or payments between, by, thru, or to, any bank-
ing institution •••• * 
It has never been clearly settled that the 
discretionary authority of the Treasurer over the price of 
gold has not been set aside by subsequent legislation. It 
may require a court finding for the matter to be finally 
resolved. However, the other legislation cited above is 
still in force and may conceivably be resorted to as a 
direct method of company differences between the Treasury 
and the Reserve System. 
3. Balance of Power 
In practice, the effective balance of power rests 
with the Federal Reserve authorities. The normal opera-
tions of the institution are directly concerned with finan-
cial matters; the ordinary powers of the institution give it 
seneral control over money and credit movements. By shift-
ing its large portfolio of government obligations thru 
open market transactions, by its control over reserve re-
quirements, discount rates, by its selective credit con-
trols, and thru the influence on bankers generated by its 
high prestige, the Federal Reserve System is able to ex-
ercise a large degree of control over financial matters. 
However, the limitations on the control of the 
* 32, pp Fl,4 
System are also very significant. We have seen that the 
power potential of the Treasury, although as yet unexer-
cised, is great enough to nullify, and even to control 
the activities of the Reserve. M::>reover·1 the System has 
relinquished one of its most important weapons against 
inflation by its support program for government securities. 
Orderly markets for government bonds are very necessary, 
and the Federal Reserve is best able to guarantee them. 
But if the System is to fulfill its statutory obligation 
to regulate the supply, availability, and cost of money 
and:· credit in response to the needs of the economy, then 
it cannot oblige itself to maintain government bonds at 
all times at fixed unchanging levels. 
Another factor which limits the ability of the 
Federal Reserve System in its monetary control arises out 
of the multiplicity of Federal Agencies which exercise 
independent authority in financial fields. While most of 
these agencies of themselves have only minor control, 
their aggregate effect may be sufficient to offset Reserve 
attempts to a more delicate regulation. The combined 
lending power of these agencies is significant; their 
interest charges are either set by legislation or self-
determined, but in either case may be directly opposed 
to Federal Reserve activities. Some of the more important 
of these agencies are described in the following chapter. 
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IV. Other Important Government Agencies 
Although the participation of the government in 
financial affairs is principally handled by the Federal 
Reserve System and the Treasury, a significant amount of 
power in the aggregate is possessed by a number of other 
federal agencies. 
A. The Department of Agriculture 
Efforts of the federal government to contribute 
to greater stability of the economic position of the farm 
population represent some of the earliest advances of the 
government in financial fields. The peculiar nature of 
production and distribution hazards, over which he had had 
little or no control, has long seemed to require govern-
ment assistance. The black depression between the first 
and second world wars inspired most of the remedial legis-
lation and assisting agencies in operation today, but some 
parts of the laws were written in the nineteenth century. 
Among the most important divisions of the De-
partment of Agriculture which extend financial aid to the 
farmer are: 
1. The Commodity Credit Corp.* 
The Commodity Credit Corp was organized October 
17, 1933 under the laws of the State of Delaware, as an 
* 49, pp 219,,220 
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agency of the u. s. From October 17, 1933 to July 1, 1939, 
the Corporation was managed and operated in close affilia-
tion with the Reconstruction Finance Corp. On July 1, 1939, 
it was transferred to the U. S. Department of Agriculture. 
A permanent charter was granted the Agency in 1948. Capi-
talization was set at $100 million, with authority to 
borrow up to $4,750 million for use in carrying out its 
programs. 
Among the major programs are the support of farm 
prices; the procurement of agricultural products to meet 
the needs of u. S. Government agencies (principally those 
administering relief programs abroad), cash paying foreign 
governments, and international relief agencies; the pur-
chase abroad to meet both domestic and foreign requirements; 
the exchange of surplus agricultural commodities for 
strapegic and critical materials produced abroad. 
Under its storage facilities program, the Cor-
poration purchases and maintains granaries, makes loans 
for farm storage construction, provides storage use guar-
antees and undertakes such other operations as may be 
necessary to carry out its programs. Loans are also made 
to the Secretary of Agriculture for soil conservation 
purposes. 
2. The commodity Exchange Authority* 
The Commodity EXchange Administration, established 
* ibid p 220 
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in June 1930, was consolidated with other agencies in 1942, 
then reestablished in 1947 as a separate agency designated 
as the Commodity Excb.a.nge Authority. 
As presently functioning, the A~thority super-
vises trading on commodity exchanges designed as contract 
markets. There are 18 such markets in operation today. 
The functions of the Authority are to prevent price manipu-
lations and corners affecting agricultural commodities 
specified under the Act; to prevent dissemination of false 
and misleading crop and market information affecting 
prices; to protect hedgers and other users of the commodity 
futures markets against cheating, fraud, and manipulative 
practices; to insure the benefits of membership privileges 
on contract markets to cooperative associations of pro-
ducers; to insure trust-fund treatment of'· .ma.rgin money and 
equities of hedgers and other traders and p~event the mis-
use of such fUnds by brokers; to provide information to 
the public regarding trading operations on contract markets. 
3. The Farm Credit Administration* 
The Farm Credit Administration was originally 
created in the Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916 and has since 
been amended and reclassified in sundry resolutions and 
acts of Congress. In 1943, by Executive Order, the Admini-
stration was given its present status as a separate agency 
* ibid p 221-225 
or the Department of Agriculture directly responsible to 
the Secretary. 
The general purpose of the Farm Credit Adminis-
tration is to provide a complete and coordinated credit 
system for agriculture by making short and long term 
credit available to farmers. It also provides credit 
racilities for farm cooperative marketing, purchasing, 
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and business service organizations. Under the Administra-
tion the United States is divided into 12 rarm credit 
districts, each having a Federal land bank, a Federal 
Intermediate Credit bank, a bank for cooperatives; and a 
farm credit board. 
The tvel ve Federal Land Banks make long term 
loans secured by first mortgages on farm lands, and issue 
farm loan bonds secured by these mortgages. Loans may 
be made for not less than $100, nor more than $100,000 to 
any one borrower. The loans, which carry interest rates 
of 4 to 4.5% are financed principally by the sale of con-
solidated Federal rarm loan bonds to the investing public. 
The intermediate credit banks make loans to and discount 
paper £or production credit associations, banks for co-
operative~ ; State and national banks, agricultural credit 
corporations, livestock loan companies, and similar fi-
nancing institutions. They make certain types of loans 
to farmers cooperative associations, but do not lend 
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directly to farmers or otherwise conduct a general banking 
business. 
The Production Credit Corporations provide 
short term credit for all types of farm and ranch opera-
tions. In addition to the twelve district corporations, 
there are about 500 local production credit associations 
which are cooperative organizations of farmers and stock-
men who make and collect the loans. The size of each loan 
depends on the financial requirements of the member's 
individual farm operations. No loans are made for less 
than $50. They are usually made on a budgeted basis for 
periods up to one year. -The Central Bank for Cooperatives 
and the twelve district banks for cooperatives provide a 
permanent source ot credit on a sound business basis to 
farmers cooperative associations. Three distinct classes 
of loans are made -- commodity, operating capital, and 
facility loans. Interest rates are determined as provided 
by law, but differ depending upon the type of loan. Com-
modity loans carry the lowest interest rate, operating 
capital loans the next higher rate, and facility loans the 
h~ghest rate. 
In the year ended December 31, 1949, farmers and 
their cooperative associations used $1.7 billion in credit 
supplied by units opera~~ng under the Farm Credit Admini-
stration. Of this total, the production credit associations 
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loaned $956 mill~on; the banks for cooperatives loaned 
$383 million; the land banks and the national farm loan 
associations loaned $182 million; the intermediate credit 
banks loaned $172 million. In addition the intermediate 
banks had discounts and loans to production credit associa-
tions and banks for cooperatives aggregating $1,417 million. 
4. The Farmers Home Administration* 
The Farmers Home Administration provides super-
vised credit for farmers who cannot get the credit they 
need elsewhere at adequate terms and under reasonable con-
ditions. Credit is supplemented where necessary by assis-
tance to borrowers in planning and adopting some farm and 
home practices which will promote success in farming. In 
its operation the Administration makes loans of several 
different types. 
Operating loans are made to farmers and stockmen 
who operate family size farms to which they devote most of 
their time and from which they derive most of their income. 
No more than $3,500 may be borrowed during any year, nor 
can the outstanding debt total more than $5,000 for any 
one borrower. Loans carry interest of 5% and are repayable 
in from one to five years. 
Farm ownership loans are made on a 40 year 4~ 
basis for the purchase, improvement, or enlargement of 
.. • 
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family size farms. The Fa.rmers Home Administration also 
insures mortgages on loans made by private lenders for 
purposes similar to those for which direct farm purchase 
loans are made. Other lending authority encompasses 
loans for the construction or repair of homes and farm 
buildings, for building, improving, or repairing water 
facilities, and for relief in the event of flood or dis-
aster. 
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Operating loans totaling $93 million were made 
to 125,350 farmers in the 1949 fiscal year; farm ownership 
loans in the amount of $14,890,000 were made to 2,370 
farmers. In addition to direct loans, 1,180 insured loans 
for $8 million were made. In the West 838 water facility 
loans to individuals and 17 loans to water associations 
totaled $1.5 million. A total of 44,126 veterans alone 
received credit thru these agencies during the year. 
The Farmers Home Administration is responsible 
for servicing and collecting all outstanding loans made 
by farmer agencies -- the Farm Security Administration 
and the Emergency Crop and Feed Loan Division of the Farm 
Credit Administration. From 1935 until establishment of 
the Farmers Home Administration, the Farm Security Adminis-
tration and its predecessor, the Resettlement Administration, 
made rural rehabilitation loans to about a million farmers. 
The loans amounted to more than a billion dollars; by 
June 1949, 87.4 percent of the matured principal had been 
repaid, plus more than $115,893,500 in interest. 
5. The Federal Crop Insurance Corp.* 
The Federal Crop Insurance Corp. was created 
within the Department of Agriculture under the Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act of 1938, with an authorized capital 
stock of $100 million. The scope of functions of the 
Corporation has often been modified by amendatory legisla-
tion, most recently in August 1949. 
The purpose of the Corporation is to improve 
the economic stability of agriculture by protecting the 
farmers crop investment against production hazards over 
which he has no control. The insurance offers the farmer 
protection of his crop investment at a premium rate which 
is designed to result over a period of years in a balance 
of premiums paid against losses incurred. 
6. The Rural Electrification Administration** 
The Rural Electrification A,dministration was 
created under authority of the Emergency Relief Appropria-
tion Act of 1935 to make loans for the purpose of furnish-
ing and improving rural telephone service. The REA lends 
money at a rate of 2% for a maximum of 35 years for the 
construction of rural electric facilities to serve rural 
people who do not have central station electric service. 
* ibid p 227,228 
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The law provides that preference should be given to public 
bodies, cooperatives, and non-profit or limited dividend 
associations. 
Through March 31, 1950, Congress had authorized 
loan funds totaling $2,295 million. More than $2 billion 
had been loaned to 1,067 borrowers for the construction 
of electric distribution, generation, and transmission 
facilities, and for financing the purchase and installation 
of electric appliances. It was estimated that these 
approved loans will provide for the construction of approx-
imately 1,162,600 miles of line and related facilities to 
serve about 3,538,900 farms and rural dwellings. ay the 
end of March 1950, 997 REA ·financed power systems, com-
prising more than 984,000 miles of line, were in operation 
serving 3,136,000 consumers. 
B. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.* 
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. was organized 
under authority of the Banking Act of 1933, to insure the 
deposits of all banks which are entitled to the benefits 
of insurance under the law. The major functions of this 
Corporation are to pay off the depositors of insured banks 
which close without adequate provision having been made 
to pay deposit claims, to act as receiver for all suspended 
* ibid pp 308-311 
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national banks and ror suspended state banks when appointed 
by State authorities, and to prevent the continuance or 
development of unsafe and unsound banking practices. The 
Corporation may also make loans to or purchase assets from 
. the insured banks, when such loans oD pur_9hase.s ~ :vill facili-
tate a merger or consolidation and will reduce the probable 
loss to the Corporation. 
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. is not sup-
ported by Congress; its entire income consists of assess-
ments on insured banks at the annual rate of one-twelfth 
or one percent of their average deposits less authorized 
deductions, and income from investments. However, bor-
rowing from the Treasury is authorized to a maximum of 
$3 billion when required for insurance purposes. This 
borrowing privilege has never been exercised. As of 
December 31, 1949, the surplus of the Corporation amounted 
to approximately $1.2 billion. 
All member banks of the Federal Reserve System 
are required by law to be enrolled for insurance; any bank 
in the u. s. or its territories is eligible for insurance. 
These latter banks may withdraw at any time after joining, 
with insurance on existing deposits continuing for two 
years &rter withdrawal. The deposits of each depositor 
in an insuranced bank are covered to a maximum of $5,000. 
Insurance extends to every kind or deposit, including 
regular commercial, time and savings, and non-invested 
portions of trust funds. No distinction is made between 
public and private deposits, and the insurance applies 
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even though security such as depository bonds or collateral 
may have been furnished by the bank for the repayment of 
such deposits. 
Of the 14,205 operating commercial banks and 
trust companies in the United States and possessions on 
December 31, 1949, deposits in 13,436 banks or 94% of 
the total, were insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
corp. The principal powers which the Corporation exer-
cises over insured banks aDe as follows: 
1. Periodic examination of insured banks not 
members of the Federal Reserve System; examination of 
member banks with the consent of the Comptroller of the 
Currency in the case of national banks, and of the Board 
of Governors in the case of other member banks. 
2. To terminate the insured status of a bank 
whicp continues after notice and hearing, to engage in 
unsafe and unsound practices. 
3. To approv.e or disapprove of proposed mergers 
With non-insured banks. 
4. To act as receiver for all suspended national 
banks, and for suspended State banks when appointed by 
State authorities. 
5. To make loans to, or purchase assets from 
insured banks, in order to facilitate mergers or consoli-
dations, or to reduce risk or avert threatened loss to 
the corporation. 
6. To approve or disapprove proposals to reduce 
or retire the capital of an insured bank not a member of 
the Federal Reserve System, except a district bank. 
7. To approve or disapprove a proposal by an 
insured bank not a member of the Federal Reserve System 
to establish and operate a new branch, or remove a branch 
from one location to another. 
8. To regulate certain types advertising; to 
require insurance protection against theft, etc.; to 
prohibit prematurity payments of time deposits, or waiver 
of notice in regard to savings deposits,; to regulate in-
terest rates on time deposits, and prohibit interest on 
demand deposits for banks not members of the Federal Re-
serve System. 
c. Economic Cooperation Administration* 
The Economic Cooperation Administration is an 
independent agency of the Federal government, created by 
the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 to administer the 
European Recovery program. The purpose of the Administra-
tion is to furnish material and financial assistance to 
* ibid pp 299-303 
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nations participating in a plan of European recovery. 
Economic programs for the Far East are still in process 
of development by the Administration, through which 
assistance will be given to Korea, China, Indo-China and 
elsewhere in Southeast Asia. 
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In order to become eligible for assistance under 
the Act, each participating country must conclude an agree-
ment with the United States Government which provides for 
the adherence of such country to the purposes of the Act 
and makes other appropriate provision, where applicable, 
for taking financial measures toward stabilizing the 
currency, promoting production, cooperating with other 
participating countries in the exchange of goods, furnishing 
the United States with needed materials, rendering reports 
on the progress of the assistance program, and taking other 
measures calculated to expedite a return to economic self-
sufficiency. In countries where assistance is to be fur-
nished on a grant basis, a local currency deposit is to 
be set up in commensurate amounts, and under such terms 
as may be agreed to between the country and the United 
States. 
D. Reconstruction Finance Corporation; 
The Reconstruction Finance Corporation was created 
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on January 22, 1932 by the Reconstruction Finance Corpora-
tion Act. The principal objective of the Corporation at 
the time was to render aid to distressed banks in order 
to alleviate the wave of failures in process. Within 
six months, the Corporation had outstanding loans in 
excess of $1 billion mostly to banks and financial in-
stitutions.* The general purposes of the Corporation as 
outlined in the original act and altered by subsequent 
amendment, are to aid in financing agriculture, commerce 
and industry, to encourage small business, to help maintain 
the economic s t ability of the country, a,nd to assist in 
promoting maximum employment and production.** 
The avowed policy of the Corporation has been 
to avoid competition with private lending institutions 
by refusing to lend where credit is available on reasonable 
terms from other sources. Major decisions are made by a 
five man board of directors appointed by the President 
with Senate approval, and are carried out through a number 
of subsidiary organizations with specialized jurisdic-
tion. Since 1932 the RFC has distributed more than $37 
billion in the form of loans, investments, advances to 
government agencies, and war expenditures. Loans have 
totaled $9.5 billion of which about $900 million were 
outstanding at the end of 1950.*** By the end of World 
* 25, p 118 
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War II, the Corporation owned wholly about 1000 war plants, 
and owned in part another 1000. Holdings included $3 
billion in aircraft plants, $1 billion in steel making 
facilities, aluminum producing properties costing $800 
million, a $715 million synthetic rubber industry, and 
$500 million worth of pipe lines. These have been mostly 
sold to private industry in the interim, but large holdings 
have been retained.* 
As the world's largest single lending organiza-
tion, the Administration of the RFC has encountered a 
great deal of investigation and criticism. The discretion-
ary power of the five man government board in the disposi-
tion of billions of dollars is an obvious source of temp-
tation. During most of its existence, however, the opera-
tiona of the Corporation seem to have been characterized by 
a high degree of integrity. Postwar loans which have been 
widely publicized and castigated have included $37·5 million 
to the Lustron Corp., now bankrupt, $4 million to Waltham 
We.tch, $10 million to Texmass Petroleum, $1.3 million to 
Mapes Hotel Corp. and smaller loans to corporations, many 
of which entered bankruptcy shortly after receipt of the 
loan.** 
The RFC was formed with an original authorized 
* 16, pp 331-333 
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capital of $500 million paid in by the Treasury. Its 
original borrowing power of $1.5 billion, has been in-
creased to a present total of about $17 billion. Later 
amendments reduced the capitalization to $100 million.* 
Specific authority is possessed to make loans, 
or buy obligations and securities of the following type 
institutions: any business enterprise organized or 
operating under the laws of any State, with the provision 
that the Interstate Commerce Commission or the Civil 
Aeronautics Board must approve in the case of railroads 
or air carriers; any domestic financial institution; 
states, municipalities, and political subdivisions of 
states. Limited discretionary authority is given to 
make flood· or catastrophe loans. 
In 1948 authority was granted to extend assis-
tance for prefabricated housing or large scale modernized 
site construction. In connection with the government 
synthetic rubber industry, the RFC is authorized to per-
rorm production, sales, plant maintenance, and certain 
disposal operations. Thru the Federal National Mortgage 
Association, a former subsidiary, the Corporation has 
extended credit to assist veterans and others to acquire 
homes by purchasing and servicing so-called "G I" home 
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loan mortgages, and FHA mortgages. The RFC has also engaged 
* 49, p 405 
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in the purchase of surplus :property for resale to small 
business, and has guaranteed loans for the purchase, con-
version or operation of surplus plants and production 
facilities by small business.* 
:_. _y. Summation 
Altho the more important federal financial 
' 
a~ncies are described above, there remain many others not 
included either because their financial powers are un-
important or secondary to other functions, or because 
their influence on money and credit is indirectly achieved 
thru control of securities issuance. The Veteran's Ad-
ministration guarantees or insures loans granted to veterans 
by other financial institutions for limited purposes. The 
Export-Import Bank makes loans and guaranties which serve 
to promote the export and import trade of the United States. 
The International Monetary Fund is an association of nations, 
of which the United States is a leading member, designed 
to promote foreign exchange rate stability. Another in-
ternational organization, the International Bank for Re-
construction and Development attempts to foster international 
investment mostly from private United States sources, for 
the reconstruction of war ruined areas and the development 
of economically backward nations. The Securities and 
* 48,. p 1 'l 
73. 
Exchange Commission is the watchdog of security markets 
protecting the investor for manipulatory practices, and 
requiring corporations to release regular financial state-
ments. The Interstate Commerce Commission and the Civil 
Aeronautics Board have controlling authority over security 
issues by the railroads and the airlines respectively.* 
The principal impressions given by a panoramic 
view of the degree of government participation in financial 
affairs are the ubiquity of federal interests, and the vast 
overlapping of functions. Within the Department of Agri-
culture alone, a single loan application may be considered 
within the jurisdiction of two or more separate organiza-
tions. The same loan may be obtained outside the Depart-
ment of Agriculture from at least two other agencies, or 
may be guaranteed or insured thru any of four separate 
channels. We have seen that the financial structure has 
developed in this way because of the hesitation of Congress 
to grant at one timB to one agency the powers that it has 
been willing to grant at various times to several agencies. 
A major overhauling and streamlining of the present system 
is highly to be desired in the interest of increased efficiency 
and economy. A consolidation of agencies would serve to 
fix responsibility for actions, and reduce the temptation 
toward abuse in the exercise of powers. 
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VI. Analysis Of Events Of The Half Century 
In the preceding chapters we have traced the 
development of the financial role of government since the 
beginning of the century. We have seen the growth of the 
process, sometimes gradual, sometimes swift, until at mid-
century the federal government stood firmly astride the 
whole financial world. 
Three facts stand out in bold relief in analyzing 
the period. First, although the failure of private control 
to prevent abuse and disorder sparked the movement, legis-
lation has tended to go beyond the requirements of correction 
into the realm of control. Second, although the greatest 
impetus was given by the deflation of the thirties, the 
movement has adapted itself with equal facility to infla-
tion -- advancing with each new crisis and relinquishing 
few of the gains in subsequent more nearly normal periods. 
Third, although our financial institutions remain relatively 
free in most important ways and government action so far 
has been largely supplementary, only minor legislative 
changes would be required for the establishment of a complete 
financial dictatorship. To understand the period and to 
evaluate future prospects each of these points must be under-
stood. They are developed at some length below. 
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With few exceptions, the laws and institutions of 
our generation which affect financial affairs have had 
their inception in the abuse of private control, or in the 
failure of private finance to supply a needed service. In 
common with all generalizations, this is not wholly true. 
However, it should be recognized that regulation of security 
issues and transactions, of bank reserves, of credit terms, 
has arisen because public interest demanded and made in-
evitable such regulation. 
The ''robber baronsfl of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century were the real authors of many of 
the regulatory commissions functioning at mia-century. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission was created to 
prevent organized attempts to disorganize security markets. 
Recurrent bear raids, market corners, the use of pools, 
matched or wash sales, the fraudulent development of un-
sound financial structures, and other depredatory practices 
assured ultimate intervention. Similarly, uneconomic and 
larcenous tactics in railroad financing and building forced 
the establishment and expanded the functions of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission. As a result of experience with 
the railroads, the Civil Aeronautics Board was given early 
control over airline financing.* 
The government lending agencies evolved because 
* 15, pp 218~219,817; infra p 7,25 
private finance was unable or unwilling to supply credit 
on moderate terms, when the risk of default was great. 
Since the risk of default is greatest during downswings 
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in the business cycle when the need for liberal credit is 
most urgent, the natural self-interest of private banking 
tends to aggravate depressions. Only the government is 
able at these times to discount the probability .of a higher 
loss ratio against the greater good to be achieved through 
easy credit conditions. In principle, these activities 
are necessary and good. In practice, the good has been 
interwoven with bad, and the necessity has provided a 
direction without imposing a tangible boundary. 
The concealment by corporations of pertinant 
financial information from stockholders, especially in 
respect to new flotations, has resulted in the exaggerated 
and burdensome requirements of voluminous prospect! and 
registration statements. The unethical use of their posi-
tion of trust by corporate officers and directors evoked 
punitive legislation which today makes many corporate 
officials unwilling to invest more than nominal amounts 
in the securities of their own companies. The irresponsi-
bility of bankers in using demand deposit funds for long 
term investments and loans prompted the extremely pain-
ful, forced division of commercial banking and investment 
banking into separate, individual entities. The failure 
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of the banking system to solve the peculiar credit diffi-
culties of the farmer has resulted in a virtual government 
monopoly of the highly profitable farm loan demand. The 
federal government, especially in the past two decades, 
has shown great alacrity in taking over any financial 
function neglected by private banking.* 
The impressiveness ·;of the gains made by the 
government is partly due to the almost complete lack of 
intervention prior to this century. It is difficult for 
us today to realize the almost untrammeled jurisdiction 
of private financial enterprise in the nineteenth century. 
In its beginning the movement was cautious and 
gradual. The inadequacy of the monetary system to cope 
with expanding needs of industry was highlighted by the 
depression of 1907. The Federal Reserve System was de-
signed to solve the problem by coordination and control of 
currency and credit movements, and by adding a badly needed 
elasticity to the money supply. The inflation during and 
after World war I occasioned increased regulation, but it 
was mostly of a temporary nature. Aside from some additions 
to Federal Reserve powers, the only surviving piece of 1m-
portant legislation is the Trading with the Enemies Act.** 
It was not until the early days of the New Deal 
thirties that the growth of government· ,reached its greatest 
* l, pp 320,458-466 
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acceleration. The blackest depression in our history swung 
public sentiment from the laissez-faire of the twenties 
to a general insistence for intervention. The government 
was exhorted to do something even if, as Will Rogers said, 
it was only to burn down the White House. It is important 
to note that the government alone is able to respond to 
the psychological need for dramatic action under such 
circumstances, and that the response necessarily advances 
authoritarianism. In view of the tremendous impetus given 
by the last depression, one can only speculate as to the 
federal structure which will emerge from any future depres-
sion. 
If the intangible nature of the movement could 
be given substance and charted, we should probably find 
that the greatest proportionate advances were made during 
the deflation of the thirties, but that in absolute size, 
the gains made during the war and postwar .inflation of the 
forties were equally great. The urgent preoccupation of 
the banks with the financing of enormous government wartime 
expenditures prevented them from coping with the simul-
taneous increase in industrial requirements. The absorp-
tion by the banking system of a sizeable proportion of 
the rapidly expanding debt made commercial loan operations 
relatively much less important. The greater part of in-
dustrial wartime production and expansion was financed 
through retained corporate earnings, or directly by the 
government.* In the postwar, the banks managed to re-
capture part of their traditional markets, and by 1950 
'19. 
bank balance sheet ratios had been restored to more normal 
relationships.** 
However, the inability of the government to make 
more than a token reduction of the debt structure in the 
prosperous postwar period, and the imminence of future 
sizeable deficits preclude a fUll return to what might be 
considered normal banking operations. Through debt manage-
ment methods alone, the federal government is able to 
exercise as profound an influence on banking operations 
and money rates as it can through any legislated authority. 
Moreover the expanded functions of federal lending agencies 
are not likely to be more than partially relinquished. 
In fact, the striking feature of the entire 
movement is the almost complete lack of retrogression. 
Since the first World War there have been innumerable 
forward steps, and only two important steps backward. The 
first of these occured when the Capital Issues Committee 
was allowed to expire in 1919. During the war the Capital 
Issues Committee had been created to control the volume 
of corporate security flotations. Plans for new financing 
were submitted by corporations to the committee which 
* 27, p 3 
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judged them according to the practicability or purposes, 
the prospects ror success, the contribution to the war 
effort, and even the character of the principals involved.* 
The committee was short-lived, but it is of more than 
ordinary historical interest, because it represents the 
most extreme reach of federal control over corporate financing. 
Even the jurisdiction granted fifteen years later to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission involves a narrower 
operating area than that enjoyed by the Capital Issues 
Committee. The other backward step, less directly concerned 
with finance, was the abandonment of the National Recovery 
Administration wh~ch bad attempted unsuccessfully to regu-
late almost all phases of economic activity.** 
Rapid as has been the mutation of government 
functions, the changes in economic philosophy have been 
even more striking. As early as 1880, when laissez-faire 
was very much the dominant political philosophy, economic 
theorists were tentatively groping toward the concept of 
an enlarged statism. The "Society for the Study of National 
Economy" was organized by E. J. James and s. N. Patten 
about this time to promote an increase in the functions . 
of the state, emphasizing labor legislation, railway 
legislation, and the conservation of natural resources. 
In what was a really radical proposal for the time, the 
society sought 11 to combat the widespread view that our 
* 24, p 1265 
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economic problems will solve themselves, and that our 
laws and institutions which at present favor individual 
instead of collective action can promote the best utili-
zation of our natural resources and secure to each individual 
the highest development of all his faculties." Professor 
Lewis Haney in his discussion of the society concluded 
that "the program proposed was too detailed to secure 
the adherence of enough economists for the organization 
of the society~" and it was soon abandoned.* 
The basic tenets reappeared however, in the fall 
of 1885 when the American Economic Association was founded. 
In its statement of principle, this highly influential 
organization declared: 
''1. We regard the state as an agency whose posi-
tive assistance is one of the indispensible conditions of 
human progress. 
2. We believe that political economy as a science 
is still in an early stage of its development. While we 
appreciate the work of former economists, we look not so 
much to speculation as to the historical and statistical 
study of actual conditions of economic life for the satis-
factory accomplishment of that development. 
3. We hold that the conflict of labor and capital 
has brought into prominence a vast number of social problems 
whose solution requires the united efforts, each in its 
* 10, p 882-883 
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own sphere, of the church, of the state, and of science. 
4. In the study of the industrial and commercial 
policy or government, we take no partisan attitude. We 
believe in a progressive development of economic condi-
tions which must be met by a corresponding development of 
legislative policy."* 
It is not mere coincidence that the government 
began to take a more active interest in business affairs 
only five years later, with the passage of the Sherman 
Act, nor that the first fifty years of the twentieth 
century saw the State increasingly accepting and enlarging 
its role of "positive assistance" as an "indispensible 
condition of human progress." Economic theory had pointed 
the way, and vas to continue to lead the movement toward 
a more and more "responsible" government. Theorists 
abandoned the ~YOrY tower of abstraction in increasing 
numbers, for the realities of the market plan, and the 
legislative chambers. 
No comprehensive analysis of the philosophical 
origins of American twentieth century applied economics 
has yet been written. Certainly, in order to do the 
task justice it would be necessary to give credit (or 
blame according to your political views) to a great number 
of economists on an international basis. It would be a 
* ibid p 884 
highly superficial treatment which acknowledged the 
contribution of Professors J. B. Clark, Simon Patten, 
Irving Fisher, or Frank Fetter, without mentioning the 
debt to Cassel, Walras, and Jevons. One could not treat 
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of the theories of Dewey, Tugwell, Means, and Mitchell 
without recognizing the preeminence of Veblen, Mar.x, and 
even Hegel. It would not be valid to weigh the contribu-
tion of Pigou, Edgeworth, Marshall or Mill, without show-
ing how much they derived from Ricardo. 
It is far beyond our purpose here to attempt to 
trace the influence of the great economists, or to show 
the peculiar contribution of each to the evolved structure. 
That task must await the pleasure of some more pains-
taking and competent student of economic theory. Never-
theless, it would be fruitless to delve into the physical 
evolution of government development, without some con-
sideration of the existence of an underlying philosophy. 
In order to appraise the strength and the permanence of 
the physical development we must answer the question: 
Has the growth in government control over financial in-
stitutions which we have witnessed come as a result or 
an unrelated series of expedient measures to meet changing 
conditions, or is the growth basic to an underlying phil-
osophy which holds sway? Only if the latter is true may 
. 
we aspire to some tentative conclusions as to the~~rmanence 
and future growth of the movement. For our purpose then 
we need explore merely the more obvious philosophical 
aspects of the trend. 
After the radical first steps of the Society 
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for the Study of National Economy, and, more importantly 
the American Economic Association, economic thinking 
settled back to a more even rate of development. The 
first World war with its subsequent dislocations again 
spurred the development of economic philosophy. Unsettled 
world conditions during the twenties and thirties pro-
duced what have been somewhat effusively called the only 
sound and important contributions to economic thought 
since the writings of Adam Smith, and the most ~nfluential 
politico-economic theories since the writings of Karl Mar.x. 
The acknowledged master and leader of the new economics 
was Lord John Maynard Keynes, brilliant British author and 
teacher. The immediate acceptance of Keynesian tenets 
was surprising, since traditionally, new economic theories 
are never even acknowledged until several years after they 
have been disproved. Keynes' writings attracted their 
widest and most sympathetic audience in America where many 
of our most influential economists were early converts. 
The direct influence of Lord Keynes on Administra-
tion officials at least during Roosevelt's first term is 
difficult to establish. The President was not a Keynesian 
himself, nor is it likely that Baruch, Morgenthau, Pro-
fessor Moley, or other leaders were consciously apostles.* 
Although many of the techniques adopted coincided with 
Keynes' recommendations, a study of the period leaves the 
impression that this was more accidental than deliberate. 
Professor Seymour Harris in commenting on the period says 
that " ••••••• it is not easy to find indubitable evidence 
of Keynes' direct influence on New Dealism •••••• A survey 
of economic policies particularly in the early years of 
the New Deal reveals so much confusion, so many incon-
sistencies, and so many serious errors that Keynes would 
undoubtedly not wish to take too much credit for what was 
done. '1** 
Many of the major policies of the Roosevelt Ad-
ministration were Keynesian in character if not directly 
in origin. The concentration of effort toward internal 
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recovery rather than international exchange rate stability, 
the expansion of the money supply through low interest 
rates, and high government deficits, the employment of large 
numbers of idle workers on public projects, were all basic 
both with the Administration and with Keynes. In respect 
to the deficits at least, the choice appears to have been 
forced upon the Administration. At first, honest efforts 
* ~7~ pp 226,226 
** 1.2,. p 18 
were made to finance the government relief outlays without 
excessive borrowing. Taxes were raised to increase revenues; 
government employees were given a 15% pay cut. However, 
the failure of other expansionary policies to initiat e an 
immediate recovery soon led to a wholehearted embracing of 
deficit spending.* 
The redistribution of income thru taxation, in 
order to increase the purchasing power of the lower income 
groups, and to promote other desired economic ends was 
proposed by Keynes in his General Theory. "Income taxes, 
especially when they discriminate against 'unearned' in-
come, taxes on capital-profits, death - duties and the 
like are as relevant as the rate of interest; whilst the 
range of possible changes in fiscal policy may be greater 
in expectation at least, than for the rate of interest it-
self. If f iscal policy is used as a deliberate instrument 
for the more equal distribution of incomes, its effect in 
increasing the propensity to consume is, of course, all 
the greater."** This idea was incorporated into Admini-
stration policies as early as 1935. In the Revenue Act of 
that year, graduated corporate taxes and increased levies 
on large incomes were used to force a redistribution of 
wealth. The Undistributed Profits Tax of 1936 had the 
avowed purpose of increasing consumer spending.*** 
* ibid: pp I'l ,451 
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Out of the confusing melange of experimentation, 
fiscal policy evolved as the cornerstone of the entire 
program. When the only reduction of federal expenditures 
coincided with the 1937-38 downturn, the prominent place 
of deficit spending in future programs was guaranteed. 
President Roosevelt spoke like a confirmed Keynesian in 
his budget message of 1940 when he said that the experience 
of 1938-39 should remove any doubt as to the effectiveness 
of fiscal policy related to economic need; with government 
intervention, the decline in income from 1937 to 1938 had 
been kept down to $8 billion -- compare the drop of $42 
billion from 1929 to 1932; and whereas in 1937-38 production 
activity had turned upward in nine months, in the earlier 
episode the country had experienced four years of liquidation 
and depression.* 
Later, in his 1941 budget message, the President 
spoke of "the deliberate use of government funds and of 
government credit to energize private enterprise" in raising 
national income 69 percent in the four years from 1933 to 
1937, and he again used the 1937-38 depression to point 
up "the effectiveness of a fiscal policy related to economic 
need."** 
The actual influence of government policies in 
stimulating the recovery has been long and fruitlessly 
* 12, pp 17 ,18 
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debated. There are many reasons for withholding from the 
government full credit for the upturn. The recovery was 
on pretty much of a world-wide basis, and took place just 
as clearly in countries when government actions were 
directly opposite to those pursued in this country. The 
Brookings Institution decided after careful study of the 
1929-1935 period that "it is difficult to establish con- . 
elusively whether government policies as a whole have been 
a stimulating or a retarding influence."* 
However, there must always be skepticism concerning 
the efficacy of economic policies. The dynamics of economic 
affairs prevent us from ever knowing what would have been 
the results of alternative courses, or to weigh the influence 
of individual elements. Nearly as important as the actual 
effect of government act~on is the appearance of a cause 
and effect relationship between the action and the result. 
There were three long years after 1929 during which the 
federal authorities did nothing and the depression progres-
sively worsened. Beginning in 1933 the government did act 
and there was a recovery. Almost necessarily the Admini-
stration has been given credit by most, whether meriting 
the credit or not. 
Thus a government official could proudly say in 
1936, without fear of contradiction that in the operation 
of the recovery program only the difficulty of educating 
* b,_ p 45:3 
the public to the wisdom of the plan prevented a more 
rapid recovery; that «•we have not come this far by acci-
dent. The depression did not blow away; it was halted. 
Recovery is not flowing down from interstellar space; it 
was planned."* 
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Proponents of a government-planned prosperity have 
in more recent years pointed to the wartime experience of 
the United States as the final proof of the omnipotence 
of federal spending in originating, supporting and sus-
taining a condition of prosperity. The argument is in 
fact very nearly indisputable. The influence of government 
fiscal activities in regard to the upswing of 1933-1937, 
the 1937-38 slump, and the subsequent recovery in late 
1938 could be, and has been, hotly disputed. But no 
serious economist deprecates the influence of federal 
spending during the forties. With the war as the initiating 
factor, the boom has been government-financed beyond any 
reasonable doubt. 
The record is highly persuasive. By running up 
the federal debt from $40 billions to $260 billions,** the 
government swept the entire economy along to unprecedented 
heights. National income ballooned to $225 billions from 
$75 billions;*** gross national product climbed from 
* 29. p 5 
** 42. p 338 
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$90 billions to $260 billions, more recently attaining 
a fabulous $300 billions* annual rate. 
Moreover, almost all of the unsatisfactory 
features of previous booms were eliminated. In contrast 
to his previous underprivileged situation, the farmer 
has been a full partner, or, more accurately, a senior 
partner in the prosperity. The problem of unemployment 
became merely a disagreeable memory; labor was in ex-
tremely scarce supply at premium prices. Due both to 
taxation policies and the high scale of labor wage rates, 
there was a more equable distribution of income than ever 
in our history. 
This, in turn, had a significant broadening 
effect on markets. The postwar public, with their vast 
hoard of war-accumulated savings, was in the market en 
masse to buy new homes, new automobiles, household appli-
ances, and all type consumer goods. The boom pervaded 
all of industry. The economies of mass production were 
never more fully realized; corporate profits successively 
soared to new all-time annual peaks as the prosperity 
continued into the fifties. 
Side by side with the consumer industries, the 
capital goods industries maintained the pace. Dazzled 
by the seemingly insatiable demand for their products, 
industrial expansion and modernization programs were set 
* 44, p S.42 
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at higher and higher levels. The television industry 
sprang from insignifcance into the major industry class 
almost overnight. The stock market alone lagged the 
boom, still licking its wounds after the premature 
optimism of 1946. Then in mid-1949 the stock market 
too caught fire; in a year and a half the 1946 highs 
had been reached and passed. 
This then was the long promised economy of 
abundance; the millennium, if it had not been reached, was 
at least in sight. And over it all stood the benevolent 
great white father, still showering largess through con-
tinued deficit spending. The Administration was allowing 
no doubt as to the origin of the prosperity, and on the 
basis of accumulated evidence seems determined to stimu-
late the economy into a continued expansion. 
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There are two groups which have suffered during 
the postwar boom. The first of these is the fixed-income 
population, often referred to generically as "tlwtdows and 
orphans". As the prosperity has gone up, so has the value 
of the dollar gone down. The prewar dollar has become the 
postwar sixty-cents, and the purchasing power continues 
to decrease. Thus the pensioner has not only failed to 
share in the boom, but has seen his real income nearly 
halved. This also means that a large part of the higher 
national income has been purely visionary, although the 
real increase is still substantial. 
The other group is the .,traditional" economist 
class. Raised in the sacred tradition of what they call 
"financial integrity", they have been unable to adjust 
to the easy money policy of the past twenty years. They 
have consistently predicted disaster, and they have con~ 
sistently been wrong. Like it or not, the United States 
has been experiencing a prosperity unparalleled in the 
history of the world, and the major impetus has been given 
by government deficit spending. 
Has the omnipotence of fiscal policy therefore 
been proved? Is government spending in itself enough 
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to prevent future depressions, and even to support a con-
stantly expanding prosperity? There are still many 
reasonable grounds for doubt. Without attempting to 
minimize the effect on the economy of the enormous war 
expenditures, it must be recognized that many other factors 
have been present. The low level of investment during 
the sub-normal thirties, the deferred wartime consumption 
and the high war caused incomes, all contributed to the 
boom. Postwar production has been well in excess of con-
current consumption, - has been working off a deferred 
demand, partly dating back to the early thirties. The 
postwar level of capital expansion has been at a rate 
which is impossible to maintain for any long period of 
time due to raw material, labor, and demand factors. 
This is the heart of the boom -- deferred demand 
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accumulated for several years causing excess production in 
satisfaction of past and present consumer and industry needs. 
The government may indeed have sponsored the boom, but 
other factors were important factors in maintaining it. 
On the basis of the evidence accumulated so far, 
it would be extremely rash to conclude that the vagaries 
of the business cycle have been completely solved and need 
no longer concern us. A more reasonable assumption is 
that, as in the past, the excesses of any one period must 
ultimately be atoned for by deficiencies in a subsequent 
period. In order to prevent depression troughs, it would 
seem that we must prevent prosperity peaks. Government 
postwar policies have but rarely sought to exercise a 
moderating influence. Should a downturn eventuate, it 
is felt that merely increasing government spending assures 
recovery. The wide subscription to the doctrine virtually 
assures a complete testing in the event of another severe 
deppession. To bring back vigor to a $300 billion economy, 
deficits might conceivably approach those experienced in 
World War II if the recovery turned out to be sluggish. 
Economic theorists have generally accepted the 
doctrine of compensatory fiscal policy, or of pump-priming. 
An influential group led by Professor Hansen of Harvard 
ascribe to government action final responsibility for 
economic events. The basis for the belief lies in the 
absence in the mature u. s. economy of private forces 
dynamic enough to provide recovery. As Terborgh stated 
the position (before attacking it) 11 The decline of invest-
ment for expansion which characterizes the mature economy 
precepitates chronic oversaving and ushers in an era of 
secular stagnation and recurring crises from which there 
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is no escape except through the intervention of government ... * 
The publication of the findings of the Temporary National 
Economic Committee served to substantiate this theory in 
the opinion of its authors. The concept of a permanently 
highe~ level of federal expenditures which has been so 
highly regarded since the later New Deal program, arose 
directly from the influence of the economic maturity 
philosophy.** 
The reluctance of Congress at times to grant 
extreme power has been the only positive factor limiting 
the jurisdiction of federal agencies operating in financial 
fields. Often the restraint of Congress has been exercised 
in the face of a popular willingness to grant whatever 
power which might have been requested. There have been 
two instances when popular re~erenda would probably have 
granted the executive department even more sweeping authority 
than was granted through the legislature. 
* 2.2, p 3 
** 1 , pp 235-236 
The first was during the depression when the 
temper of the people was to support any policy through 
which relief was promised. The second instance was in 
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the early days of the second World War when the mood of 
the nation was to grant in the name of the war any desired 
legislature no matter how far removed from war influences. 
This, of course, is typical of mass thinking in time of 
great stress. One of the recognized functions of Congress 
is to maintain its perspective so that the rest of us may 
lose ours, without losing our liberty as well. 
ABide from altering or reflecting proposed 
legislation, Congress has fulfilled this function prin-
cipally by making powers and agencies temporary, or effec-
tive only during emergencies, or by the oft-repeated stipu-
lation that the purpose of a newly-created agency was to 
supplement private endeavor, not to compete with it. This 
rather vague requirement has been scrupulously observed, 
for the most part by the various government agencies oper-
ating in financial and other fields. 
As affecting federal lending agencies, the pro-
vision generally stipulates that government credit shall 
be available to the borrower only when private sources are 
unable or unwilling to provide credit at reasonable rates. 
The "reasonable rate" provision ha.s generally been inter-
preted in the light of prevailing interest rates with only 
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minor emphasis on over-all credit conditions of the country 
or the risk factor involved. As desired, the effect is 
that loans in the public interest have been made when private 
sources have been unwilling to supply credit. Another less 
desirable effect is that in many cases where credit would 
have been available from private sources at a slightly 
higher interest charge due to risk factors, the borrowing 
has been negotiated through federal agencies at low rates. 
This appears to be competition within the meaning of the 
restriction, and is a possible source of future friction. 
There has been little friction on this account 
as yet because of the abundance of investment opportunities 
since the thirties. Wartime exigencies distorted banking 
operations; federal debt expansion and support policies 
allowed the banks to become fully invested by keeping 
cash reserves in the form of Treasury notes, or "interest-
bearing cash". When and if prewar banking conditions recur, 
lending operations of federal agencies will be scrutinized 
with a more jaundiced eye. 
In spite of these attempts at restriction, the 
legal authority which has been granted to the executive is 
nearly complete. As brought out in our earlier discussion 1 
of powers of the Treasury, the President in times of emer-
gency may exercise through the Secretary of the Treasury 
dictatorial authority over the nation's banking system.* 
rr the past two decades are indicative or the ruture, we 
shall be under emergency conditions more orten than not. 
Regulation begets regulation; the erfective use 
or a given power orten makes additional powers necessary 
to insure the success of planning. A clear instance of 
this pyramiding of power is seen in the first Roosevelt 
Administration. The desired end was recovery, and the 
principal method was considered to be a: rerla.tiGn":of the 
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price level. Several methods of rerlation were simultaneously 
pursued; one or the more important was devaluation or the 
dollar. In order to avoid private proriteering from the 
devaluation, the government was compelled to take title to 
all gold and to prohibit rree gold movement. The gold clause, 
common to both private and public contracts had to be voided. 
The abrogation of the gold clause especially in regard to 
the governments own contracts was much criticized. Under 
the existing circumstances there was no loss caused to 
creditors, but even had there been it was too vital a part 
of the plan to be by passed. An essential element of govern-
ment planning in a complex society is that in order to plan 
anything, it is necessary to plan a great deal. 
Because an undertone of criticism has been 
* infra p 53,54 
apparent at times in this analysis, it is only fair to 
report that the over-all impression derived from the study 
is that government policies have for the mostpart been 
at least as sound as might have been expected were private 
institutions making the decisions. The government has 
gone further in some respects than can be considered wholly 
desirable, but mostly the functions it has assumed fall 
within its proper perogatives. It is not so much the total 
jurisdiction of government agencies that is the flaw, but 
the overlapping of function and lack of cohesion. It is 
not so much the legislated authority which we fear but 
the control generated by the public debt. It is not the 
exercised power, but the potential power that gives us 
pause. It is not so much what the government has done, 
but what the government thinks it has done: the complete 
unshakeable confidence in the power of government money 
to prevent depression is one of the two most dangerous 
developments of the period. The other is the casual 
acceptance of the tremendous government debt. Having 
proved the economists wrong about the size of the debt 
structure which the economy is capable of support~ng, the 
government is unlikely to take unpopular restr~ct~ve steps 
to l~mit further debt expansion ~n the event of another 
war or depression. Indeed the aim is not merely to prevent 
depression, but to stimulate an ever-expanding prosperity. 
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If it should develop that government theoris~ are 
/" 
r0ng, 
that there is still a "down" side to the businers~·-cy_ci~;-~_ -
it may justly be feared that the downturn will be ac~ompanied 
by sky rocketing deficits, and a runaway inflation, cul-
minating in a highly magnified government sponsored crash 
of tremendous proportions. This is admittedly the extreme 
possibility. However, even should the actuality be much 
less terrifying, the impact on the structure of our society 
may well be great. 
On the basis of the experience of the last half 
century, it is a strong likelihood that in the event of 
a prolonged and severe crisis, our financial institutions 
will emerge fully and completely regulated. 
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Nat.ional Capital Press Washington , D.c. 1947 
36. Federal Reserve Bulletin September 1937 
3'1. Federal Reserve Bulletin May 1938 
38. Federal Reserve Bulletin May 1942 
:39. Federal Reserve Bulletin March 1950 
40. Federal Reserve System, purposes and functions 
National Publishing Co .. Washington., D.C. 1947 
Bureau of the Census: 
41. Statistical Abstract of the U. S·. 1946 
42.. Statistical Abstract of the U. S. 1950 
Department of Commerce~ 
43. Survey of Current Business February 194'1 
44. Survey of Current Business February 1951 
45. survey of Current Business - Statistical Supplement 1949 
Department of Labor~ 
46. Monthly Labor Review March 1951 
National Industrial Conference Board:: 
4 '7. Economic Almanac for 1950 New York 1950 
Moody's Investors Service: 
48.. Moody's Government Manua1 1951 New York 1951 
u. s. Government~ 
49. U. S~ Government Organization Manual 1950-1951 
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